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After the demise of Soviet communism, the People's Republic of China
(PRC) is often considered an anachronism and relic of a failed philosophy and
system. Moreover, Chinese leaders are assumed to be abandoning their
communist roots in all but official rhetoric as the country pursues economic
modernization. In fact, the Chinese form of communism has evolved
significantly. Struggle has given way to stability, austerity to prosperity, and
hostility to peaceful co-existence. This transition has had tremendous
ramifications for PRC foreign and security policies. What was once a highly
articulated and systematic ideology, providing a distinct and accurate guide to
policy choices in the international arena, has become more akin to a set of
general principles to guide behavior in an increasingly complex system. This
thesis asserts, however, that while many of the specific tenets of Maoism have
fallen to the wayside or been modified, many of the concepts, language, and
thought processes of Chinese communism continue to form the thinking of
Chinese policy-makers, thus they interpret and justify foreign policy choices in
ideological terms. Consequently, ideology is more relevant to political processes
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the post-Cold War era, communism as an "ideological force" is
considered significantly diminished, if not eliminated, as a threat to U.S. security
interests. In fact, some scholars suggest that ideology, depending on how the
term is defined, is on the decline as a motivating force for revolution (or even
less radical change). Yet the world's most populous country continues to
embrace a form of communism as official, or formal, ideology. The recent official
exaltation of Deng Xiaoping Theory by the 15th Party Congress, while expanding
and accelerating economic reform, does not abandon the Four Cardinal
Principles. These principles, adopted in the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping's
leadership, stress that all policies must be in conformity with: (1) Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, (2) the socialist road, (3) continuation of the
people's democratic dictatorship, and (4) absolute political dominance by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
However, apparent contradictions between official ideology and policy
decisions in many areas are seen as eroding the political legitimacy of the Party
and foretelling a Chinese future reminiscent of the collapse of Soviet
communism. In fact, official ideology has evolved to such an extent that present
efforts to build a modern "socialist market economy" (socialism with Chinese
characteristics) and relate peacefully to the international community are hardly
contrary to ideology at all. With respect to those concepts most crucial to foreign
and security policy, Beijing has officially rejected its simplistic view of an
inherently hostile world consisting of "two camps" or "three worlds." Instead, it
recognizes the international system as increasingly complex but perceives it as
the most potentially peaceful the country has ever faced. It has rejected autarky
for greater integration into world global regimes. And just as importantly, primary
domestic goals of struggle and austerity have been rejected in favor of stability
and prosperity.
IX
Central to an understanding of this evolution, however, and potentially the
most enduring aspect of the Marxist legacy in China, is the cognitive processes
which have provided the framework for this ideological change. Far from
rendering official ideology irrelevant, the Chinese application of the dialectical
reasoning process encourages an ideological dynamism which permits the
rejection of "practical" ideology that has been proven unsuitable. And not only
has it evolved, but official ideology has also assumed a different role in the PRC.
Official ideology now provides the general parameters, or principles, for
governmental policies rather than providing rigid "templates" to which policies
must conform.
While the substance and role of official ideology has changed, it has
always influenced People's Republic of China (PRC) foreign and security
policies. The case study concludes that in the early years of the PRC, ideology
provided relatively clear-cut policy choices and served as a linking mechanism
with the rest of the communist world, but that over time Maoist dogma proved to
be unsuitable for China's long-term prospects. Yet for all its flexibility, the
challenges of a highly dynamic international system, along with those of
maintaining internal political stability and accommodating the rising forces of
nationalism, official ideology has begun to constrain the PRC's ability to adapt.
Finally, the thesis explores prospects for further ideological development
and considerations for U.S. China Policy over the short and long term. It
concludes that the CCP leadership is still grappling with the principal
contradictions of dogma versus pragmatism, China's role in the community of
nations, and pluralism versus Leninism. The eventual synthesis of these
contradictions will set the course for PRC relations with the international
community and ultimately influence regional, and even global, stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
/ have been the whole day without eating, and the whole night without
sleeping - occupied with thinking. It was of no use. A better plan is to learn.
Confucian Analects
A. BACKGROUND
In the post-Cold War era, communism as an "ideological force" is widely
considered diminished, if not eliminated, as a threat to U.S. security interests. In
fact, some scholars suggest that ideology, depending on how the term is
defined, is on the decline as a motivating force for revolution or even less radical
change. Yet, the world's most populous country continues to embrace a form of
communism as the official, or formal, ideology of the state and ruling party. The
recent official embrace by the 15th Party Congress of Deng Xiaoping Theory,
which exalts socialism and Communist Party leadership, even while expanding
and accelerating economic reform, indicates that the People's Republic of China
(PRC) has not abandoned this ideology.
There are, however, serious questions over apparent contradictions in
official ideology and policy decisions in many areas. Experimentation with
broadened forms of property ownership, such as corporate shareholding
arrangements, and increased privatization of larger sectors of the economy
suggest market forces are becoming relatively more important in the planned
economy as China focuses upon modernization. Since the reform period began
in 1978, many argue that official Party ideology has become increasingly
irrelevant as a source for the future direction of society. The Party leadership is
criticized as having no clear vision of the shape of the long-term future, apart
from insisting that it will reflect "socialism with Chinese characteristics." In fact,
former Party general secretary Zhao Ziyang was once quoted as saying that the
process of rule through Party ideology is analogous to that of using stepping
stones to cross a river, one step at a time, but it is never clear as to what one will
find on the opposite bank. 1 Chinese intellectuals speak today of a sixiang weiji
(crisis of ideology) and ajingshen weiji (spiritual crisis). 2
Conversely, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains in firm control
of political processes and at the time of the 15th National Party Congress in 1997,
the membership of the CCP stood at 58 million; 9.92 million more than at the
time of the 14th National Party Congress in 1992. More than 43 percent of
members had an educational background above that of senior high school, some
20 percent were women, and over 22 percent were below the age of 35. 3 What
this growth suggests for continued CCP's rule and implications for future
ideological developments are important issues for this thesis.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
In spite of the contemporary crisis, ideology is reputed to have been a
powerful and pervasive influence in every aspect of Chinese life with Mao
Zedong at the helm of the CCP. Is it really as irrelevant today as most observers
suggest? This question must begin with an exploration of how official ideology in
the PRC has evolved since the communist victory in 1949. Specifically, what is
the nature of contemporary official ideology in the PRC? Further, to what extent
has official ideology influenced Chinese foreign and security policy decisions in
the past? Does official ideology propel the PRC toward greater international
cooperation, isolation or confrontation?
I hypothesize that official ideology continues to shape the views of
Chinese policy makers to a greater extent than most observers realize. More
specifically, this study will affirm that while major tenets of official ideology have
been re-evaluated, certain dogmatic elements remain important. And perhaps
more importantly, the cognitive processes embedded in Chinese Communist
1 Cited in Peter Ferdinand, "Social Change and the Chinese Communist Party: Domestic
Problems of Rule," Journal of International Affairs, 49, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 479.
2 Perry Link, "China's Core Problem," in China in Transformation, ed. Tu Wei-ming (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1994), 192.
3 Robert F. Ash, "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation: July-September 1997," The China
Quarterly (December 1997): 913.
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philosophy have remained central in the decision-making processes of PRC
leaders and thus continue to shape the direction of further change. Finally,
many of the ideas brought to the foreign policy arena by the leaders of the PRC
are derived from the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.
C. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY
The central research question will first be placed within a theoretical
framework by exploring the origin and meaning of relevant political science
concepts and the applicability of several policy-making models. With this
foundation, the thesis turns to an historical examination of what Mao might refer
to as the "dialectical interaction of theory and practice" by assessing the
evolution of official CCP ideology to its current amalgam of Marxism-Leninism-
Mao Zedong Thought-Deng Xiaoping Theory. More specifically, the evolution of
the key concepts which have guided Chinese foreign and security policy
processes will be identified and traced. The research will draw primarily upon
the writings and speeches of China's "core leader" as a gauge of the Party's
ideological perspective. This study will focus upon the "sinification" of Marxism-
Leninism and its influence on foreign policy under Mao, the evolution of Deng
Xiaoping Theory, and the increasing importance of nationalism to the 'Third
Generation" of communist leadership.
Chapter III will employ a longitudinal single case analysis to explore the
relevance of ideology in PRC foreign and security policy-making processes since
1949. While it is possible to evaluate ideological influence on the evolution of
policy in a number of areas, such as agriculture, science and technology, public
health, or energy, the focus of this thesis is upon the foreign policy processes for
several reasons. First, as a military officer, I am interested in the evolution of
critical factors that influence foreign policy decisions and consequently the
likelihood of military conflict. Second, authority over the foreign policy process is
still considered highly centralized in China, unlike several other areas of public
policy. This argument, as well as the next, will be developed more fully below.
Finally, the foreign policy process should prove more suitable than domestic
policy processes for an analysis of this nature as it is relatively less affected by
elite power politics and bureaucratic structure. These characteristics should
allow a more definitive conclusion regarding the influence of official ideology,
which approximates the independent variable on the outcome of several specific
PRC policy decisions.
The longitudinal study will examine four significant Chinese foreign policy
decisions in an attempt to determine the extent to which ideology played a role.
The study relies upon content analysis of primary source material available
through the Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS) and other translated
official Chinese documents, periodicals, and speeches to identify prominent
trends in ideological concepts likely to have influenced the policy process.
Secondary source information is also employed to reinforce and broaden
interpretations. Finally, Chapter IV considers prospects for further ideological
development in the PRC and implications for its external relations. Chapter V
concludes the thesis.
D. DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS
The concept central to this thesis, and therefore, requiring definition is
"ideology." In political science literature, "ideology" appears as difficult to define
as "democracy." In fact, it appears that political scientists are unable even to
agree on whether ideology is a positive, negative or neutral feature of modern
society. This debate will not be settled here. However, a definition must be
arrived at before continuing.
In his comprehensive model addressing foreign policy processes, Joseph
Frankel explores several definitions of ideology. One attempt is "a system of
political, economic, and social values and ideas from which objectives are
derived." This approach would likely incorporate the totality of what Steven
Levine defines as "formal" and "informal" ideology. 4 The concept of informal
ideology draws upon the anthropological notion of culture as ideology and
considers the complex of cultural values, preferences, prejudices, pre-
dispositions, habits, and unstated but widely shared propositions about reality
that condition the way in which political actors behave. In this sense, ideology is
not a system of thought decision-makers choose, but something bestowed upon
them by historical-cultural inheritance. This cognitive process is certainly
interesting and highly relevant to political processes in China, but the focus of
this study is formal ideology, at least until the prospects for future ideological
development and their influence on PRC international behavior are considered.
Accordingly, a definition more relevant to this study is:
An action program derived from certain doctrinal assumptions
about the nature of reality, and expressed through certain stated,
not overly complex, assertions about the inadequacy of the past or
present state of affairs. Those assertions include an explicit guide
to action outlining methods for changing the situation, with some
general, idealized notions about the eventual state of affairs. 5
Even though the concept has evolved and there are points of contention,
this definition appears to possess the major elements most scholars associate
with ideology. An excellent summary is also provided by Leon Baradat:6
• Ideology is foremost a political term, though it can be applied in other
contexts.
• Every ideology consists of a view of the present and a vision of the
future usually expressed in materialistic terms.
• Ideology is action oriented.
4 Steven I. Levine, "Perceptions and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy," in Chinese Foreign
Policy: Theory and Practice, eds. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), 33.
5 Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making (London: Oxford
University Press, 1963), 121.
6 Leon P. Baradat, Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1979), 30.
• Ideology is intended to mobilize a large number of people.
• Ideologies are normally expressed in fairly simplistic and motivational
terms.
As a final note on this concept, Levine argues that as China approaches
50 years of CCP rule, it is inevitable that the two aspects of ideology become
less distinct. This proposition is supported by John Bryan Starr, who posits that
in a "post-revolutionary system," ideology relates to culture as thesis relates to
antithesis. The result of this relationship over the course of time is an altered
ideology as well as an altered culture. 7 Chapter IV returns to the implications of
this relationship when considering prospects for China's future.
Another important concept which must be defined to delineate the scope
of inquiry is "foreign policy." Accordingly, James Dougherty defines foreign
policy as "the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of external choices
within one country, viewed from the perspective of that country."8 Consequently,
the study does not linger upon the various theories which address the nature of
the international system except as necessary to consider systemic influence on
Chinese strategic thought in specific instances. This is not to deny the significant
linkages between international relations and domestic politics, but rather to
acknowledge the former embraces "more than the aggregate of two or more
national foreign policies." In other words, international relations theory focuses
more upon the larger interactive processes between states while this study
focuses on factors internal to the Chinese political process, specifically official
ideology, which influence the perspective of PRC policy-makers.
E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Before turning to the substantive issues of this study, it is necessary to
place the research question within a more structured theoretical framework. Are
7 John Bryan Starr, Ideology and Culture: An Introduction to the Dialectic of Contemporary
Chinese Politics (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 43.
8 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International
Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 19.
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there theories or models, for example, which suggest that ideology can be
expected to influence the policy-maker? If so, how does it influence the policy-
maker, and specifically in the Chinese context?
There is certainly no shortage of scholarly literature which explores policy-
making processes in general, and foreign policy processes as a subset of this
phenomena. Moreover, efforts at better defining the nature of the Chinese
policy-making system have become increasingly important for "sinologists."
Kenneth Lieberthal, a noted China scholar, for example, explores the application
of "rationality" and "power" models to Chinese policy-making before offering his
own "bureaucratic structure" model which emphasizes the importance of formal
structures.
9 This approach, or variations thereof, seem increasingly common in
contemporary China studies. "Bureaucratic authoritarianism," borrowed from
conceptualizations of South American politics, is a similar approach used to
emphasize the retention of ultimate, unlimited authority by the central party state
with the highest power concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, or even
one.
10 Yet the applicability of many of these models appears more appropriate to
the analysis of economic policy making and is of lesser use in Chinese foreign
and security policy studies.
An analytical model which overcomes this weakness is the micro-macro
linkage approach." Employed by Quansheng Zhao in his analysis of the
Chinese foreign policy, this model explores these processes on several
dimensions. At the macro level, the model considers international system and
structure as well as domestic social and other internal institutions. More
pertinent to my thesis, however, is the exploration of the micro level, defined as
"decision-makers," whether individuals or small groups, and the factors which
9 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and
Processes (Princeton: NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988), 16.
10 Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds., Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives
From Insiders (Armonk, NY: East Gate Books, 1995), xxv.
11 Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 23.
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influence their interpretation of the internal and external environments. Policy
decisions are considered "outputs" resulting from the complex interaction
between the micro and macro levels as seen in Figure 1
.
Input: International Forces <-> Domestic Pressures





Figure 1. A Micro-Macro Model
The micro-macro linkage approach proposes that neither macrostructure,
nor decision-makers at the micro level, have complete control over the state's
policy processes, but that the level of influence is relative depending upon the
policy arena. For example, in areas such as economic, urban, or energy
resource development, policy-making has become increasingly decentralized
and bureaucratized in response to the complexity of these concerns and to
improve efficiency.
In other policy areas, however, and even in the wake of the political and
economic reforms since 1978, the Chinese political system and decision-making
processes have remained fundamentally authoritarian in nature. Moreover, this
characteristic is particularly noticeable in the formulation of foreign and security
policy, which continues to be highly centralized and personalized and lacks
8
institutionalization. The model submits, for example, that "foreign policy is
directed by and highly reflective of either one individual's or a certain set of
individual's perceptions, tendencies, and preferences." 12 Therefore, efforts to
understand Chinese foreign and security policy processes require a balanced
approach with attention to individuals at the center as well as analysis of
systemic and institutional factors. It is at the micro-level that ideology is perhaps
most critical, influencing policy-makers perceptions, priorities, and preferences.
Affirming the validity of this model, Frankel argues that policy-makers are
influenced by both an "external" and "internal" setting. 13 The external setting
includes the state's geopolitical position within the global setting and all relevant
inter-state relationships. The internal setting includes the whole structure of the
state's political and social system. While recognizing the interrelationship of
these variables, Frankel gives emphasis to the internal setting and its influence.
After all, he suggests, this environment largely determines the perspective, or
"world-view," of individuals. Decision-makers, he logically posits, naturally
internalize their societies values through partaking in the national culture and
characteristics, and through being constantly exposed to influences and
pressures in the play of domestic politics. 14 Further, within any society are
"reference groups" with whom decision-makers identify most closely and whose
values they also internalize. 15 This latter influence appears to approximate the
ideological indoctrination attributed to communist regimes.
Ultimately Frankel's model embraces an interaction, or fusion, of









Many terms are employed to denote this inner element: ideologies,
doctrines, values and valuations, utilities, policies, commitments,
goals, objectives, purposes, ends, programmes, interests or the
national good, aims, principles, ethos, the way of life, etc. 16
Echoing Frankel's emphasis upon value-systems, Steven Levine argues
that Chinese leaders, like policy-makers everywhere, bring to their encounters
with the complexities of foreign affairs sets of presumptions, values,
expectations, preferences, and operating assumptions that derive from three
sources. First is their socialization into a particular culture at a particular period
in time or informal ideology. Second is their unique experiences as individuals
and shared experiences as members of a group. Third is their conscious
choices as thinking political actors from the menu of values, systems of thought,
and so forth that are available to them. Each person is not only influenced by
experience, but also actively creates a persona as a political actor through an
ongoing process of conscious choice. Through this process of creation and self-
creation, foreign policy actors acquire a particular Weltanschauung or
ideologically-based world view. 17 This view of political reality, whether simple
and intuitive or highly complex and formally articulated, structures the policy-
maker's environment for choice, informs his consideration of various courses of
action, and provides rationalizations for the choices that are made.
These theories and concepts underscore the importance of both
ideological and systemic factors to the internal processes of the decision-maker.
The following considerations also urge continued evaluation of ideological
developments in the PRC:
• Official ideology played and continues to play a significant role in the
political, economic, and social organization of the PRC. This
organization remains fundamentally Leninist and informs
communications, reasoning, political-social structure, and population





and the Party "cadre" have become the core elements in modern
Chinese society. 18
• While tempting to scorn CCP leadership's continued trumpet of
ideology as fanciful, and even hypocritical, a more objective view
acknowledges the political necessity of this behavior. Abandoning the
ideology, which has provided the pillars of the Revolution, government,
and social discourse for the past fifty years, would only further
undermine whatever political legitimacy the Party possesses. Official
ideology must be upheld and fine-tuned - to do otherwise would be
detrimental to regime survival.
• While the CCP's track record has included some spectacular failures
and disasters, its overall record as perceived by the general population
has been one of great success. 19 The Party is seen as having led the
country from chaos and transformed it into a powerful nation-state. Its
leadership, especially during the last two decades, has made China
one of the most dynamic countries in the latter half of the twentieth
century. The success of modernization and reform policies have
added legitimacy and staying power to the Party, though a serious
economic downturn could negate this trend. Thus, we need to be
more familiar with its evolving official ideology.
Accordingly, this thesis explores the evolution of key ideological concepts
which have shaped the Chinese world-view, and therefore the international
behavior, of PRC leadership.
18 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of





II. FROM REVOLUTION TO REFORM - CHINA'S EVOLVING
IDEOLOGY
This chapter focuses upon the content of Chinese ideology, and how it
has evolved since 1949, as drawn primarily from the writings and speeches of
the "core leader." Specifically, the focus is upon the premier leader's perception
and portrayal of the key attributes of the domestic and international
environments, as well as China's global role and strategic goals. While this
viewpoint does not represent all aspects of official Chinese ideology, it generally
serves as an excellent indicator of the consensus among senior leaders toward
the major operating environments which influence foreign and security policy.
It is difficult to analyze any aspect of Chinese politics without being
instantly drawn to the stark contrast associated with the change in leadership
from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. Thus, most scholarly analysis divides the
almost 50 years of PRC rule into two broad eras, the Revolutionary era under
Mao and the Reform era begun by Deng. This organization is commonly
recognized even within the PRC, and is frequently referred to in political
discourse. The decisions made by the Third Plenum of the 11 th Central
Committee of the CCP in 1978, under the leadership of Deng, provide the mark
of a new course for the PRC. Accordingly, this study emphasizes the distinctions
between these two periods.
Two other considerations merit mention. First, recognizing that even the
field of foreign policy is rather broad, this discussion will narrow its focus to the
national security component of that field. Second, an examination of official
ideology in China must begin with the precepts of Marxism-Leninism.
A. THE ORIGINS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
China's official ideology is an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism. While a
full review of the development of Marxist theory would be too cumbersome here,
13
a short survey of basic principles is useful in understanding the development of
official ideology in China. Toward that end, the following is an outline of the most
important concepts of this theory.
1. Economic Determinism
Marx built the rest of his theory upon this foundation. Essentially, this
assumes that man's primary motivation is economic. That is, what people do
politically, think, and say is determined by economic circumstances. Thus, the
foundation of any society is material, and is topped by a superstructure made up
of non-material things, such as ideology, law, religion, etc., which suits or assists
the class which controls the forces of production.
2. Dialectical Materialism
Part of this idea, namely the dialectic process, was taken from the
philosophy of Hegel. In short, Hegel developed a view of history in which
change, brought about by struggle, is the central theme. This change was a
process in which the world was progressing toward a goal, or "idea," that was
predetermined by God. In the dialectic process, the existing state of affairs, or
thesis, is challenged by a new idea, or antithesis, with the result being a
synthesis at the higher level of truth than the previous two views. The process,
as shown in Figure 2, was expected to continue until humanity arrives at the
highest level of self-awareness and freedom.
Marx rejected the metaphysical aspect of Hegel's work, but did adopt the
dialectic as the fundamental logic of history. Instead, where Hegel had seen the
struggle between divinely inspired ideas, Marx substituted the conflict between
worldly interests. In this view, ideas were the result of the dialectic struggle, and
human conflict was caused by social class differences. This struggle was seen
as closing the door on one historical stage and while opening to another, and
that each stage was characterized by a particular economic system which, in
turn, led to a specific political system. And while Marx was less clear about
specific causes of the "revolution" and type of political system which would
14
evolve, he did expect the proletariat to subject itself to a dictatorship whose
purpose was to eliminate all but a single class. 20
THESIS ANTITHESIS
SYNTHESIS
Figure 2. The Dialectical Reasoning Process
3. Lenin's Contribution
Marx is said to have spent much more time analyzing capitalism rather
than studying requirements of the coming "utopia." Lenin, by contrast, was
reputed to be more a revolutionary and practical politician than scholar, and
devoted himself to developing a revolutionary doctrine and applying Marxism to
real life. His contributions to Marxism include: 21
• Restoring a sense of urgency and spirit to the socialist movement lost
after the death of Marx and in the absence of revolution predicted by
the theory, as detailed mainly in the Communist Manifesto of 1848.
Lenin also saw the need for a small, disciplined, and totally dedicated
group or vanguard of the proletariat to stimulate the revolution.
• Modifying the theory to satisfy questions arising from historical events
which seemed to contradict Marxist theories, as well as allowing it to
apply to developing countries. Lenin's concepts of imperialism helped





why capitalists continued to experience success, and conditions of
workers actually improved in industrial countries. His theory of the
weakest link, which focused on competitive advantage between
advanced and less developed states, explained why the revolution
occurred in Russia and not Western Europe and the United States.
• Adjusting the theory to function in a "real state." Lenin held the
vanguard of the proletariat would become a collective dictatorship and
govern by the principle of democratic centralism until the state of
Utopia was reached. The economic system prescribed by Lenin Was
state socialism.
4. Mao Zedong Thought
Mao's major contributions to Marxism-Leninism was adjusting the theory
to fit Chinese culture and society. Fairbank suggests that one factor
encouraging this "sinification" was the overwhelming sentiment of Chinese
nationalism based on cultural and historical pride. In other words, the Chinese
would only accept Chinese Marxism.22 The reality of the Chinese situation also
provided other justifications. To accomplish this application Mao made
modifications to the theory itself, focusing on social class, the results of which
were something of a Chinese populism.
In the heady days of Marxism-Leninism early in the 20th century, China
was overwhelmingly rural. In fact, Lieberthal states that during this period it is
hard to imagine a society less subject to class analysis than was China. 23 Yet
while the theory was apparently inappropriate considering the nature of Chinese
society, it did provide a foundation from which to begin the effort to
fundamentally change Chinese society and culture. Moreover, and extremely
important, it provided an explanation for and solution to imperialist aggression,
seen as the principle cause of China's "century of shame." That solution was
nationalistic struggle.
22 John K. Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University,
1992), 322.
23 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1995): 74.
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The importance of Mao's emphasis on the dialectic reasoning process for
resolving contradictions and its subsequent application by Chinese communists
cannot be overemphasized. Theoretical thinking in the PRC draws heavily on
the theory that the laws of development in the world are based on the unity of
opposites. Nature in its entirety is determined by the objective dialectic in things.
Dialectics in itself is the process whereby contradictions are disclosed and
synthetically resolved.
Mao's interpretation of the philosophical principle of dialectic materialism
submitted that all things, animate and inanimate, are motivated by the incessant
occurrence and resolution innate to all phenomenon. And all phenomenon exist
in a world of continual and constant change. In his philosophical treatise On
Contradiction, Mao asserted:
The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all
things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of
all things and push their development forward. There is nothing
that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing
would exist. 24
The theory of contradictions, according to Maoist thinking, can be further
extended to social phenomena. It enables man to arrive at the proper methods
or thought processes for resolving conflicts and contradictions within society, and
can therefore be used to determine policy and the correct "political line." Further,
achievement of a higher level of social development hinges upon the correct
identification of a "principle contradiction," the resolution of which will permit "all
other problems to be readily solved."25 Accordingly, PRC decision-makers
adhere to the thesis that contradictions are the basis for all social change, and
refer to the Maoist interpretation of dialectic materialism to guide the analysis
and conduct of domestic and international affairs. 26 This interpretation of the
24 Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction," Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol I (Beijing: Foreign
Language Press, 1965), 316.
25
Ibid., 315.
26 Mohammad Habib Sidky, "The Theory and Conduct of Chinese Foreign Policy in South Asia"
(Ph.D. diss, University of Miami, 1978), 13.
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dialectic reasoning process has remained consistent in Chinese ideological work
even through the Reform era.
Other key features of Mao Zedong Thought included:
• Mind over matter. While Mao embraced the Marxist philosophic theory
of materialism, he consistently based his decisions on the conviction
that properly motivated people could overcome virtually any material
odds to accomplish their goals.
• Self-reliance. Also influenced by his views of imperialist aggression
and the years of decline under the unequal treaties, Mao insisted that
China's social and economic transformation should achieve a measure
of self-reliance which would ensure survival if attacked by an external
enemy or experienced other adverse circumstances.
• Guerrilla Warfare. Perhaps the most "exportable" Maoist idea and
arguably still relevant today. This strategy envisions a three-stage
protracted war which evolves from guerrilla tactics against the enemy's
conventional force in a war of attrition, to eventual strategic stalemate,
and then a transition to conventional offensive. In the guerrilla warfare
phase the revolutionary seeks to avoid decisive combat unless victory
is assured, and de-emphasizes territorial gains and losses as
indicators of success or failure while seeking to destroy the enemy's
will to continue fighting. Thus the key concept is the political nature of
warfare.
• Human nature. Mao firmly believed that man could be perfected
through proper education and placed considerable value in techniques
such as mass lines and campaigns for ideological indoctrination and
the value of physical labor.
• Cultural confidence. Mao was an avid student of Chinese history and
was heavily influenced by his understanding of the glory and splendor
of China's past.
B. THE DOMESTIC FACTOR
This section begins with an examination of the domestic environment
given its prominence in setting the course for PRC foreign policy. Thomas
Robinson suggests that one of the most important determinants of Chinese
foreign policy post-1949 has been the nature of the domestic political and
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economic situation. 27 Moreover, Quansheng Zhao points out that each of
China's principal domestic strategies - from the First Five Year Plan and the
Great Leap Forward through the Cultural Revolution and Four Modernizations -
have had clear and direct implications for its posture toward the rest of the
world. 28 Accordingly, the CCP's ideologically guided efforts and policies to
remake Chinese society serve as the foundation of this study.
1. The Revolutionary Era
When a country is well-governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be
ashamed of. When a country is ill-governed, riches and honor are things to be
ashamed of.
Confucian Analects
During the Mao era the focus was "politics in command." He and most
CCP leadership considered the decisive outcome of the period of revolution,
civil, and foreign wars that began in 1839 with the Opium Wars a mandate to
embark upon a radical transformation of society. The emergence of the PRC in
1949 was welcomed by thousands of well-educated and patriotic Chinese who
were not originally communists. 29 These felt, in essence, that the CCP had
gained the right to govern by triumphing over both internal divisions and foreign
imperialism. Furthermore, in the 1940s, communism, in its Stalinist form, had
considerable economic credibility and seemed to offer the means whereby China
could develop its way rapidly out of the devastated state left by decades of war.
Another important aspect of early Chinese ideology as the CCP
consolidated its rule was that the primary impetus for change was external
forces. Just as the opium trade, gunboat diplomacy, missionary inroads, and
unequal treaties had spurred the Manchu dynasty grudgingly toward reform in
the early 20 th century, these lingering influences, along with Japanese barbarism
27 Thomas R. Robinson, "Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s," in Chinese
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 592.
28 Zhao, 41.
29 Edward L. Dreyer, China at War (New York: Longman Publishing, 1995), 366.
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and extraterritorial concessions meant that ideology was fundamentally reactive
in nature and directed against imperial powers.
In considering foreign policy during the Revolutionary era, Mao is
described as being relatively less concerned with international relations than with
domestic questions. 30 Two significant exceptions to this rule - Sino-Soviet and
U.S.-Sino relations - provide the basis for the case study in the following
chapter. For now however, we consider the dominant ideological themes which
influenced China's foreign relations during the Revolutionary era via the
domestic macro structure. These key concepts include:
a focus on continuous revolution
class struggle
moral superiority and "mind over matter"
autarky and separation from the international system
an emphasis on nationalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-capitalism
focus on principles of Leninist and Stalinist rule31
a gradual embrace of neo-Marxism principles (emphasis on north-
south divide and redistribution of global wealth)32
a. Remaking Chinese Society
The CCP under Mao clearly considered itself a "revolutionary
regime." The central thesis of this self-image was that PRC leaders, especially
Mao, did not regard the goals of the their revolution as having been
accomplished with the seizure of state power in 1949. So great was the
magnitude of these goals - the transformation of man and society in the world's
oldest and most populous state - that they could only be accomplished over
what Mao referred to as a "very long historical period." Protracting the
revolution, however, meant opening up the possibility of the institutionalization of
the revolutionary forces - a process that would likely work to the detriment of the
revolutionary goals. To Mao, this meant that state power must be wielded in a
"revolutionary" way - a way that minimizes the degree of institutionalization and
30
Starr, 242.
31 John R. Faust and Judith F. Komberg, China in World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1995), 72.
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stability in the society and maximizes the degree of instability, flexibility, and
innovation. 33
Within the dialectic process, according to Mao, conflict and change
are the normal conditions of society. Stability and consensus are temporary
aberrations from that normal state. While conflict is natural, rather than a
malfunction of society, it does not resolve itself spontaneously in a progressive
direction. 34 It requires analysis and action by a revolutionary to bring about
progress.
Mao's focus on social conflict centered upon the analysis of the
conflicting groups or categories into which the society was divided. And like
Marx and Lenin before him, the most important method of grouping society was
along social class lines, with the critical division occurring between proletariat
and bourgeoisie. This was the principal contradiction and struggle in the social
realm. More than Marx or Lenin, however, Mao's political thought suggested that
class status was determined as much by ideological and political consciousness
as economic status, thus allowing a more diverse group of people to be
assembled under the proletariat category. And though the salient categories
associated with each group changed over time, the method for determining the
composition of these categories, such as attitude and behavior, and their
relationship to one another remained substantially unaltered.
b. Remaking the Chinese Economy
Given the emphasis on rebuilding society during the Revolutionary
era, it is sometimes easy to forget that Mao and other senior PRC leaders were
concerned about the requirement to remake the country's economy as well. In
fact, it was Zhou Enlai who first raised the call for China's modernization in 1954,
and the term "Four Modernizations" was coined ten years later, although with








technology.35 It was not until the issue was revived by Zhou at the Fourth
National People's Congress in 1975, and later championed by Deng, that serious
reform efforts began.36 Yet Zhou's initial call was overshadowed by Mao's focus
on political and social campaigns, and was somewhat perverted by his strong
desire to secure China's independence and autarky. Economic development
policy was also influenced by the concepts of self-reliance and moral superiority.
Further, he drew heavily from the Soviet model of central planning and emphasis
on heavy industry. These ideological pre-dispositions toward isolation and
organization would contribute to the disastrous economic policies and programs
such as the Great Leap Forward and rural communalism.
It is interesting to note that Mao's conception of self-reliance did not
totally prohibit economic relations with other states, even though Mao remained
deeply suspicious of dependence on foreigners, especially in his later years.
Underscoring this central assumption was one of the historical "lessons" from the
century of shame at the hands of imperialists. Mao was convinced that there
had existed a historic and contemporary conspiracy between foreign and
domestic enemies that had served to keep China politically weak, and that
Chinese elites with close relations to foreigners needed, at the least, strong state
supervision. However, PRC leaders recognized very early that, although close
and uncontrolled interaction with foreign powers had been dangerous politically
and economically costly, foreign co-operative relationships, properly managed,
were essential to both China's international security and domestic
development. 37
c. Institutionalizing Instability
The Mao era culminated with the Great Proletariat Cultural




37 William C. Kirby, 'Traditions of Centrality, Authority, and Management in Modern China's
Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, eds. Robinson and
Shambaugh, 14.
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remained of existing political, economic, and social structures with others that
were barely functional. This period is widely considered a disaster both in and
outside China, setting back modernization and production and further isolating
China from the rest of the world. Perhaps its most lasting impact, however, has
been an increasingly pervasive cynicism among the Chinese people about the
credibility and legitimacy of CCP ideology. 38
One author suggests that if Mao had retired before the Great Leap
Forward, he would undoubtedly be remembered as one of the greatest Chinese
leaders of all time. 39 However, the legacy of Mao's leadership is mixed. He will
always be remembered as the leader who created a modern, relatively classless
Chinese nation free from imperialist interference. Yet at the time of his death,
China was still in chaos. The chaos continued as the dominant factions centered
around Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping struggled for control of the Party and
nation. By 1978, Deng had emerged victorious and set in motion a major
ideological re-evaluation.
2. The Reform Era
When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them.
Confucian Analects
As the CCP leadership under Deng Xiaoping looked at the rest of the
world in the mid to late 1970s, they realized that China was not only far behind
the developed countries, such as the US and Japan, but also behind its small
neighbors. Even Hong Kong and Taiwan, Chinese territories ruled by capitalist
governments, were far more prosperous than the socialist mainland. Further,
Chinese society was reeling from the aftershocks of the Cultural Revolution.
Consequently, and almost a decade before Mikhail Gorbachev announced his
"new thinking" ("glasnost" and "perestroika") for the Soviet Union in 1985, Deng
Xiaoping had started a new economic, political, and social revolution in China.




After consolidating his power following the Cultural Revolution and two years of
succession struggle, Deng proclaimed that the previous two decades of PRC
policy had been misguided in many areas and set about to shift Party focus in
favor of economic development and modernization.40 Deng stated explicitly after
reforms were underway:
Comrade Mao Zedong was a great leader, and it was under his
leadership that the Chinese revolution triumphed. Unfortunately,
however, he made the grave mistake of neglecting the
development of the productive forces. I do not mean he didn't want
to develop them. The point is, not all the methods he used were
correct. For instance, neither the initiation of the Great Leap
Forward nor the establishment of the people's communes
conformed to the laws governing socio-economic
development...We must observe the laws governing socio-
economic development and follow an open policy both
internationally and domestically. 41
He would add later:
For many years we suffered badly from one major error. After the
socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of
production had been basically accomplished, we still took class
struggle as the key link and neglected to develop the productive
forces.42
This change in domestic focus, combined with dramatic developments on
the international scene discussed below, caused a major redirection in foreign
and security policy. Under Deng's leadership, the broad work of the Party
congresses during the 1980s and 1990s seems to have confirmed China's
embrace of another CCP-led revolution. Specifically, the Twelfth Congress is
credited with anointing the post-Mao reform effort, the Thirteenth Congress as
legitimizing non-state ownership, and the Fourteenth Congress as providing a
major boost to market-oriented reforms.43 The Third Generation of communist
40 Levine, 31
.







leadership, under Jiang Zemin, has taken the reins of power and appear
committed to following the Deng mandate. In fact, Deng Xiaoping Theory has
now been elevated to the position of official ideology by the 15th Party Congress
in 1997. Accordingly, considerable emphasis will be placed upon Deng's
philosophy at the height of his influence in the 1980s. This philosophy was
expressed in the three dominant themes outlined below.
a. Questioning the Revolutionary Emphasis
Deng indicates that the Eighth Congress of the Party held in 1956
had "correctly analyzed the situation in the transformation of private ownership of
the means of production and set the task of all-around socialist construction."
Yet while this political line was correct, the country "suffered many setbacks
because the Party was still inadequately prepared ideologically for all-around
socialist construction."44 This ideological shortfall existed because the Party had
misunderstood the central thesis of Marxism.
What is socialism and what is Marxism? We were not quite clear
about this in the past. Marxism attaches utmost importance to
developing the productive forces (italics added).45
An analysis of his writings indicate that Deng carefully laid the
foundation through the late 1970s for supplanting Mao's revolutionary ideals. As
the comments above indicate, however, Deng was somewhat circumspect in this
effort. While critical of the ideological direction favored by Mao, he was careful to
limit criticism of the man. In 1981 he would state
During the 17 years preceding the "cultural revolution" our work, in
the main, proceeded along a correct path, though there were twists
and turns and mistakes. Comrade Mao Zedong should not be held
solely responsible for everything; we ourselves should share the
responsibility.46
44 Deng Vol III, 14
45
Ibid., 73.
46 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82) (Beijing: Foreign Language Press,
1984), 357. Hereafter referred to as Volume II.
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Deng reserved his harshest criticism for the "Gang of Four"47 and
their "Leftist" thought which became prominent during the Cultural Revolution.
He observed, for example, in the early 1980s that the Gang of Four had
"clamored for 'poor socialism' and 'poor communism', declaring that communism
was mainly a spiritual thing." Declaring this approach "sheer nonsense!" and
arguing "pauperism is not socialism, still less communism", he would state
...in building socialism, we must do all we can to develop the
productive forces and gradually eliminate poverty, constantly
raising the people's living standards. Otherwise, how will socialism
triumph over capitalism?48
This statement demonstrates that while Deng was moving the PRC
in a new direction, he continued to perceive the fundamental nature between the
two economic systems as competitive, a view that would carry over to foreign
security policy. Even so, he also recognized that excessive isolation from the
international economic system was partly responsible for China's lack of
economic development. Claiming "one important reason for China's
backwardness after the industrial revolution in Western countries was its closed-
door policy,"49 Deng would lay the groundwork for opening to the world.
b. Proclaiming a New Direction
Deng emphasized stability and unity where Mao had valued
instability and conflict, stressed market incentives over Mao's reliance on political
consciousness, and opened China to the world vice Mao's emphasis on self-
reliance. He would go on to discarded or severely restricted revolutionary
slogans about resistance, struggle, turmoil, and transformation. Peace and
development were emphasized. This effort was officially launched in 1978 at the
Third Plenum of the Party's Eleventh Central Committee.
47 Described as the "counter-revolutionary clique" that gained significant influence during the
Cultural Revolution. Consisting of Mao's wife Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyaun,
and Wang Hongwen, this group apparently sought to position itself to seize supreme authority
following Mao's death.
48 Deng Vol II, 21.
49 Deng Vol III, 74.
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This event confirmed Deng's ascendancy to the position of "core
leader" and officially discarded "take class struggle as the key link" for socialist
modernization. The Committee also criticized the self-preserving policy of Mao's
designated successor Hua Guofeng of "two whatevers"50 and affirmed the need
to have a "correct understanding of Mao Zedong Thought as an integral whole
and scientific system." This meant "recognizing the importance of practice as
the sole criterion of truth, and deciding on the guiding principles of emancipating
minds, seeking truth from facts, and uniting as one in looking to the future."51
Deng's successful offensive against "two whatevers" as a rejection of the basic
principles of Marxism, by portraying it as frustrating the continued dialectic
development of Chinese society, underscores the acceptance of ideological
dynamism to Chinese Communism.
Declaring China would "concentrate on economic development,"
Deng became convinced that modernization of the nation's economy was the
most important goal for the regime, and that improved living standards for the
population would contribute to a return of Party credibility, both domestically and
internationally. Consequently, the dominant concepts associated with this new
direction in the domestic environment were:
• a focus on peace, stability, unity
• acceptance of a dual economy
• "empowerment" of the rural population
• an Open Door Policy and entry into the global economic system
• acceptance of basic economic and social, but not political,
liberalization
• partial shift from Leninist to authoritarian rule52
To attain its developmental goals, the CCP would have to approach
socialism "in terms never used by the founders of Marxism-Leninism,"53 as well
as an end to autarky. "Nevertheless, while holding to self-reliance, we should
50 This policy, proposed by Hua Goufeng, declared "we shall resolutely uphold whatever policy
decisions Chairman Mao made and unswervingly follow whatever instructions he gave."
51 Deng Vol II, 371.
52 Faust and Kornberg, 72.
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open our country to the outside world to obtain such aid as foreign investment
capital and technology." Moreover, Deng would emphasize the mutual global
benefit associated with China's growth, proclaiming "China's development will
benefit world peace and the world economy."54
Still, and undoubtedly reflecting the influence of civil strife
associated with the Cultural Revolution and civil war, no concept received
greater emphasis under Deng's tutelage than domestic stability and unity.
Without order, we would have to devote all our energies to
combating interference of one kind or another... 55
In fact, as the perceived threat of "bourgeois liberalization"
intensified during the 1980s, with its associated "unrest" and "practices of the
cultural revolution," Deng would step up his calls to "keep this evil trend in check"
by declaring "our goal is to create a stable political environment; in an
environment of political unrest, it would be impossible for us to proceed with
socialist construction or to accomplish anything."56 In discussing the relative
merits of "liveliness," which appears in context to refer to an increasingly spirited
domestic debate over political, cultural, and social development, Deng would
argue emphatically for order.
In addition to stability and unity, we must maintain liveliness.
Under the socialist system, both aspects form a unified whole and
are not - or ought not to be - fundamentally contradictory. But
what if, at a certain time and with regard to certain questions,
liveliness comes into conflict with stability and unity? Then what
should we do? We should try to achieve liveliness on condition
that stability and unity are not adversely affected. ..if we are to
make progress in an orderly way, when liveliness clashes with
stability and unity, we can never pursue the former at the expense
of the latter. The experience of the Cultural Revolution has already
proved that chaos leads only to retrogression, not to progress, and
that there must be good order if we are to move forward. 57
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This attitude was not limited to the central leadership. One author
has argued that, with regard to the conflict at Tiananmen Square in 1989, "for
older Chinese, the massive demonstrations against the communist regime in the
spring and summer of 1989 held out, not the promise of a new and more
humane political and social order, but the threat of a return to the anarchic
warlordism and civil unrest of the 1920s through the 1940s."58
c. Traditional Communist Themes
While simultaneously reminding the Party of the essentially
utilitarian nature of official ideology, Deng held firmly to many of the dogmatic
elements of communism. He believed, for example, the promise of domestic
stability and economic modernization could only be achieved in China through
adherence to CCP leadership and Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Thus a
movement toward economic modernization and liberalization should not be
confused with political liberalism. Proclaiming "we regard reform as a revolution"
and adhering to the roots of official ideology, Deng would emphasize:
Democratic centralism is another of our advantages. This system
works to foster unity among the people...and once we make a
decision, it can be immediately implemented. 59
Only socialism can eliminate the greed, corruption and injustice
that are inherent in capitalism... 60
Discipline and freedom form a unity of opposites; both are
indistinguishable. How can a vast country like China be united and
organized? Through ideals and discipline. Strength comes from
organization. 61
What attitude should we take towards the bourgeois culture of the
West? In learning things in the cultural realm, we must adopt a
Marxist approach, analyzing them, distinguishing the good from the
bad and making critical judgment about their ideological
58 Dreyer, 370.






content...The corruption of our young people by the decadent
bourgeois culture of the West is no longer tolerable.62
Commitment to these ideals have been expressed most
prominently in the official policy of the "Four Cardinal Principles," which upholds
the commitment to democratic centralism, absolute authority of the CCP,
Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought, and the "socialist road."
Deng stated in 1983, 'The Four Cardinal Principles boil down to
upholding socialism and upholding leadership by the Party. These two principles
are the basis for building our country and uniting all our people in a common
struggle."63 And in rationalizing China's political organization to President Bush
in February 1989, Deng would offer that "if we conducted multi-party elections
among one billion people, the country would be thrown into chaos...Democracy
is our goal, but we must keep the country stable."64 Further, "bourgeois
liberalization would plunge the country into turmoil once more. Bourgeois
liberalization means rejection of Party leadership; there would be no centre
around which to unite our one billion people...The reason the imperialists were
able to bully us in the past was precisely that we were a heap of loose sand."65
Concern over the "polarizing" effect of income disparities associated with
capitalism also encouraged the emphasis on the "predominance of public
ownership and common prosperity as the two fundamental socialist principles
that we must adhere to."66
Finally, while Deng was frequently critical of the more aggressive
methods employed during the Revolutionary era to control the population, he
never discounted authoritarian methods. When responding to concerns of
instability associated with the increasing "bourgeois influence" well into the












...our socialist state apparatus is so powerful that it can intervene
to correct any deviations. To be sure, the open policy entails risks
and may bring into China some decadent bourgeois things. But
with our socialist policies and state apparatus, we shall be able to
cope with them. So there is nothing to fear. 67
Moreover, "if some people are bent on disturbing our tranquillity,
we shall have to resort to disciplinary and legal action when necessary, or even
to dictatorial means of dealing with them."68
3. The Third Generation
By 1989, and after a fall from grace of two proposed successors in Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, Deng anointed Jiang Zemin as the core of the Third
generation. 69 While Jiang was widely believed to be an interim leader, it appears
that he has successfully consolidated his position and will continue to lead the
PRC, at least over the short-term. The recent elevation of Zhu Rongji to replace
the retiring Li Peng as prime minister, for example, appears to benefit Jiang.
Of particular relevance to this study, however, is the apparent
commitment of Jiang and other senior leaders in Beijing to stay the course set by
Deng. Moreover, and as has been the case since its founding, domestic
influences will continue to weigh heavily upon decision-makers in Beijing.
Premier Li Peng stated during a speech in Tokyo in November 1997:
China is committing itself to building a modern socialism. The 15th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China held recently
summed up the success stories in the country's reform and
opening, such as the ongoing endeavor to achieve modernization
for the past twenty years, defining Deng Xiaoping's Theory as our
guiding ideology, electing a new central leadership with Jiang
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Moreover, a recent article in Beijing Review on current developmental
policy recognizes significant progress and specifies the path that Beijing will
follow while acknowledging the significant challenges ahead:
...the 13th Party Congress put forward the scientific thesis that
China is still at the primary stage of socialism. The current Party
Congress (15th CPC Congress) reaffirms this thesis. According to
the theory of scientific socialism, socialism itself is a primary stage
of communism, and China is and will be in the primary stage of
socialism, or the undeveloped stage at present and for a
considerably long period to come. This is the most fundamental
national condition. It is the basic starting point for Chinese leaders
to formulate the political line and policies. The current congress'
reaffirmation of the thesis aims to help the Chinese remain cool-
headed before the nation's success. Although the reform and
opening have helped China lift itself out of poverty step by step and
embark on the road leading to initial prosperity, such progress is
approached in relevance to past dire poverty and backwardness. 71
Domestic issues such as political legitimacy, regional pressures, and
further reform of the state-owned sector promise to be daunting and influential to
the PRC's international behavior. However, the embrace of Deng Xiaoping
Theory by Beijing's current leadership suggests that in the dialectic struggle over
the broad approach to societal development, pragmatism and flexibility are still in
favor. Moreover, the key domestic watch words of stability, prosperity, and
openness in the pursuit of economic growth and improved living standards are
seen as key to regime survival. As Deng himself once said:
Only when the masses see concrete evidence that the Party and
socialism are good will our teachings about ideals, discipline,
communist ideology and patriotism be effective. 72
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Another significant influence shaping the formation of Chinese foreign and
security policy is leadership perceptions of the characteristics of the international
71 Yuan Pingzhou, "15th CPC Congress: Succeeding and Developing Deng's Theory," Beijing
Review 40, no. 40 (6 October 1997): 4.
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environment. It is somewhat artificial to attempt to draw a significant distinction
in perceptions of the domestic and international order when considering the
communist ideological influence. After all, Marxist ideology projected its vision of
proletariat revolution from the national to the international level. Even within
Mao's lifetime, however, dialectical thought and a dynamic international
environment encouraged a dramatic evolution in Beijing's perception of the world
order. Thus, this study traces the more critical elements of the PRC's world view
and will focus upon the core leader's perceptions of the nature and likelihood of
military conflict.
1. The Revolutionary Era
By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart.
Confucian Analects
As a communist, Mao inherited a distinctively Marxist-Leninist world view.
He accepted class struggle as the conceptual framework explaining the origins
and nature of modern conflict. As long as there were classes with conflicting
interests and different social strata, as Engels had asserted, the war between the
classes would never be extinguished. Lenin attributed the origins of war more
directly to the existence of private property.73
a. The "Two Camps" and the Nature of War
Based on these teachings, Mao articulated in December 1936 his
own view of the nature of conflict that "war is the highest form of struggle for
resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between
classes, nations, states, or political groups, and it has existed ever since the
emergence of private property and of classes."74
Further, since the existence of class struggle made war inevitable,
Mao regarded war and politics as identical. Paraphrasing Clausewitz in 1938,
72 Deng Vol III, 147.
73 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 13.
74 Quoted in Zhang, 13.
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Mao stated that "war is the continuation of politics," and added that "war is
politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times, there has never
been a war that did not have a political character."75 This view had a significant
impact on early PRC security policy with regard to the application of military
force. As Mao considered conflict normal, or even inevitable, at the international
as well as domestic levels, he became convinced that military strategies
significantly different from "People's War" were appropriate. Engaging imperialist
countries at the "front door," such as on the Korean Peninsula, allowed China to
face the inevitable on their own terms. On the other hand, Mao stressed that
war had its own peculiar characteristics and in this sense should not be equated
with politics in general. Violence was the particular feature of war lacking in
other types of politics. Thus "when politics develops to a certain stage beyond
which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep away the
obstacles from the way."76
Concepts more unique to Maoist thought are reflected in his
philosophical essay "On Protracted War." Included in this treatise are notions
that war as a phenomenon was comprehensible, which means that, while
characterized by greater uncertainty than other social phenomenon, it is,
nevertheless, "in no way supernatural, but a mundane process governed by
necessity." However, while military capability in the "objective" or material sense
shapes victory and defeat in an indisputable way, "subjective conditions" which
included the army and population's attitude, belief, political quality, and morale
were much more important. After all, military capability functioned according to
the law of the unit of opposites, as did everything else in society. The two
"opposites" intrinsic to military capability were inferiority and superiority. Mao's
view of the historical record suggested that wars were usually fought between
states with relatively weak and strong military strength. Further, the ability to
transition from the weak to the relatively strong position was largely a function of
75 Zhang, 13.
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"subjective ability" or moral superiority. Mao acknowledged that "the stage of
action for the military man is built upon objective material conditions, but on that
stage he can direct the performance of many a drama."77
Mao would go on to differentiate between revolutionary and
counterrevolutionary wars, with the former being "just" and latter "unjust." This
aspect of warfare would later influence Mao's decisions about military
interventions as, in his view, the common masses would only support a "just"
war, creating "a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that
will make up for inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites
for overcoming every difficulty in the war."78 Mao would also emphasize the
importance of political mobilization of the entire population. Mao defined political
mobilization, generally accomplished through popular propaganda, as a means
of "telling the army and the people about the political aim of the war. It is
necessary for every soldier and civilian to understand why the war must be
fought and how it concerns him."79
As a consequence of the influences outlined above, and based
upon his experiences, Mao shared a number of ideological predicates relating to
foreign and security policy with earlier communists at the foundation and early
years of the PRC. This dogma asserted that:80
• The world is divided into two inherently hostile and warring camps that
mirror the basic class division of contemporary society.
• The socialist camp and its allies, including the proletariat and other so-
called progressive forces in imperialist states, are engaged in a world-
wide, historic struggle against imperialism tnat will eventually lead to
the victory of socialism.
• Beneficial relations between socialist states and members of the











by their instrumental and transitory character. Genuine, long-term
cooperation with imperialist states is impossible given the historic
conflict between the two opposing world systems.
• Relations between socialist states are based on a common identity
rather than transitory interests. Socialist international relations are a
new type characterized by peace, long-term mutual interests, genuine
co-operation, and fraternal solidarity.
• Socialist states can forge coalitions with nationalist states and political
movements even when these are non-socialist in character on the
basis of shared opposition to imperialism.
b. The "Three Worlds"
Events of the 1 960s, however, rendered the "two camps" concept
of the international political situation obsolete. The emergence of Soviet
"revisionism" in the ideological arena, to include the abandonment of the
principal of "inevitable war" for detente with the United States, and its pursuit of
"social imperialism" placed the two communist giants at fundamental odds. The
result was the synthesis of a new Chinese world view, publicly declared in 1971,
which divided the world into three parts: a First World of the superpowers, the
United States and the Soviet Union; the Second World of developed countries or
medium powers; and the Third World of the developing states of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. The First World, in Mao's eyes, was the source of most
global problems.
Ultimately, the "three worlds" formula placed the capitalist-
imperialist United States in collaboration with the revisionist, social-imperialist
Soviets within the category of the exploitative world forces. China, on the other
hand, was seen joining, sometimes leading the revolutionary forces of the Third
World - the category consisting of the exploited and oppressed nations. Thus,
while the ideological model of international structure evolved, the final objective
remained the same - Mao continued to believe that global war was inevitable
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and that PRC foreign policy should be an instrument for achieving the tangible
goal of world communism.81
2. The Reform Era
To have faults and not to reform them, this indeed, should be pronounced having
faults.
Confucian Analects
The international dynamics of the last decade of the Cold War, combined
with China's new commitment to economic modernization and reform, placed
significant stress upon the PRC's political system and the cognitive processes
which had encouraged greater "pragmatism" and international interaction than in
the past. In fact, the PRC's international behavior shifted from almost complete
isolation to what has been described as conforming to that of essentially every
other actor in the international system.82 The demands of the Cold War system
forced China to be creative in defense of its security and in seeking support from
other nations. It attempted to balance changing external threat perceptions with
possible opportunities for increased power and influence; often with mixed
results. China's solution was to "play the international system for all it was
worth" by siding with either superpower when necessary, courting the Third
World when isolated, and acting as a great power when it was in Beijing's
interest to do so. 83 Even before Mao's death, it had pursued a policy of "leaning
to one side" or the other between the U.S. and the USSR, as appropriate, even
though it explicitly and consistently rejected the conception of this role in the
triangular balance of power paradigm. 84 All the while its rhetoric asserted the
centrality of independence.
Nevertheless, when focusing upon PRC perceptions of the most
fundamental characteristic of the international order in the Reform era, it is
81 Sidky, 10.
82 See Faust and Kornberg, 15-20, and Zhao, Chapter 5.
83 Faust and Kornberg, 19.
84 Sidky, 18.
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abundantly clear that a new "synthesis" had been reached. At a speech during a
meeting of the Central Military Commission in June 1985, Deng's comments
provide definitive insights as to the Party's changing view of the world order. In
arguing for a reduction by one million men in the PLA, Deng indicated
The first change is in our understanding of the question of war and
peace. We used to believe that war was inevitable and imminent.
Many of our policy decisions were based on this belief, including
the decision to disperse production projects in three lines, locating
some of them in the mountains and concealing others in caves. In
recent years, after careful analysis of the situation, we have come
to believe that only the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the
United States, are in a position to launch world war. But neither
dares to do so.85
He would go on to argue that the fear of nuclear annihilation, combined
with strategic setbacks experienced by both superpowers, severely constrained
the international actions of both countries, lessening the potential for war.
...the world forces for peace are growing faster than the forces of
war. The forces for peace are, first of all, the Third World, to which
China belongs...The world is vast and complex, but if you analyze
the situation you will find there are only a few people who support
war; most people want peace...Thus we conclude that it is possible
that there will be no large-scale war for a fairly long time to come
and that there is hope of maintaining world peace. In short, after
analyzing the general trends in the world and the environment
around us, we have changed our view that the danger of war is
imminent. Be
Deng would further explain that this fundamental change in perspective on
the international operational environment, along with the domestic focus on
economic modernization, had logically contributed to a significant change in the
ultimate objectives of China's foreign policy from revolutionary Marxism to peace
and development.
In view of the threat of Soviet hegemonism, over the years we
formed a strategic line of defense - a line stretching from Japan to




Europe to the United States. Now we have altered our strategy,
and this represents a major change...We pursue a correct,
independent diplomatic line and foreign policy, opposing
hegemonism and safeguarding world peace. 87
By 1990, as the strategic and economic balance of power had shifted
decisively to the United States and the Soviet Union struggled to redefine its
position, Deng would revisit the issue of further restructuring of the international
order, again emphasizing the importance of international peace and its focus on
economic development. Anticipating the coming collapse of the bipolar world
and likely emergence of the multi-polar order, Deng stated that even though
weakened, the USSR would remain a "pole" in an emerging multi-polar world.
The situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union
dominate all international affairs is changing. ..In the so-called
multi-polar world, China too will be a pole...Our foreign policies
remain the same: first, opposing hegemonism and power politics
and safeguarding world peace; and second, working to establish a
new international political order and a new international economic
order. 88
3. The Third Generation
Beijing's current view of the international system may best be reflected in
an April 1 997 joint statement released by the PRC and the Russian Federation
on the "Multipolarization of the World and the Establishment of a New
International Order" on the occasion of President Jiang Zemin's official visit to
Moscow. In the outline below, the most relevant portions of the agreement with
the term "both sides" referring to the PRC and Russia are highlighted.
• The two sides shall, in the spirit of partnership, strive to promote the
multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new
international order.
• Both sides maintain that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's






other universally recognized principles of international law should
serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations and the
basis for the establishment of a new international order.
• Both sides stand for the establishment of a new and universally-
applicable security concept, believing that the "Cold War mentality"
must be abandoned and bloc politics opposed. The differences or
disputes between states must be settled through peaceful means
without resorting to the use of threat of force.
• Both sides are of the view that the role of the UN and its Security
Council should be strengthened and that the UN efforts in maintaining
world peace and security merit a positive appraisal.
• Both sides underscore that the vast number of developing countries
and the Non-Aligned Movement are important forces in promoting
world multi-polarization and building a new international order. The
developing countries have enhanced their awareness of self-
strengthening through unity...They are entitled to take a rightful place
in the future new international order, participating, on the equal basis,
in international affairs free from any discrimination. 89
D. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES
Having examined the re-evaluation of domestic priorities and evolution of
the Chinese external world view, the study considers the influence of official
ideology upon the PRC's perception of its role in world affairs and strategic
goals.
1. The Revolutionary Era
The superior man, in the world does not set his mind either for anything, or
against anything; what is right he will follow.
Confucian Analects
Official ideology is described as having served a dual purpose in the early
years of the PRC. As an international linking mechanism, it connected China
with its socialist brethren. At the same time it served as a boundary marker,
demarcating the inner world of socialism from the outer world of China's
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ideological adversaries in the imperialist camp. 90 Thus, it provided a strong
means of defining the PRC's national self-identity and global role.
More specifically, and as discussed in detail in the next chapter, Mao's
perception of China's international role and strategic interests was largely
defined by evolving relations with the USSR, since his conception of the
"socialist camp" was a major element in his view of the international system for
most of his life. 91 Accordingly, in 1949, Mao established three principles on
which Chinese foreign policy would be based:
• Lingqi luzao - literally 'to start up the fire in a new stove' - in this
context meaning that the new China should initiate diplomatic relations
with every country on a new basis.
• Dasao ganjing wuzi zai qingke - 'to clean house first then invite
quests' - meaning to consolidate the regime first and then develop
foreign relations.
• Yibiandao - 'leaning to one side' - meaning, under Mao anyway, to
favor the Soviet Union.92
By the mid-to late-1960s, however, as Sino-Soviet relations became
increasingly strained and Mao's focus had turned inward, Beijing had isolated
itself from the outside world as much as possible, leaving its population one of
the least informed about international issues in the world.
By the time it emerged from this self-imposed isolation in the early 1970s,
and under the influence of the "three worlds" model, the PRC identified itself
most closely with the developing world. In fact, one author suggests that
Chinese "official historiography" came increasingly to emphasize guerrilla
warfare, peasant mobilization, and the leadership role of the CCP as a means of
achieving worldwide revolutionary success. The concept of "People's War," a
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91 Stuart Schram, ed. Chairman Mao Talks to the People, Talks and Letters: 1956-1971 (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 36.
41
name popularized by Lin Piao during the Cultural Revolution, was presented as
an unbeatable formula by which all Third World countries could throw off the
shackles of imperialism and colonialism. Using this argument, the PRC placed
itself at the head of the Third World and said all such countries should look to
Peking rather than Moscow for leadership. 93
During its most belligerent phase of the Revolutionary era, Beijing was
fighting against both superpowers, with border clashes against the USSR and an
undeclared war with the United States in Vietnam. It also had major differences
of opinion with many of its socialist "brothers" and friends in the Third World,
which included Indonesia, Burma, North Korea, Japan, Thailand, and India,
caused by both traditional and ideological conflicts. 94 Even though Mao made
efforts to break the isolation and lessen tension in the early 1970s with several
Western powers, his revolutionary rhetoric and dogmatic principles remained
fundamentally unchanged.
2. The Reform Era
To rule a country of a thousand chariots there must be reverent attention to
business, and sincerity; economy in expenditure, and love for men; and the
employment ofthe people at the proper seasons.
Confucian Analects
Deng's reassessment of both the domestic agenda and international
environment meant the watchwords of stability, development, prosperity, and
openness were increasingly extended to foreign and security policy.
Furthermore, there appears to be an increasing unofficial appreciation for the
more comprehensive view of the elements of national security favored in other
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economic, and cultural components of society in addition to the military as a
measure of national power.
In a January 1980 speech to Party cadres, Deng outlined the three major
tasks facing China as it entered the new decade. The first addressed
international affairs and expressed the importance of "opposing hegemonism
and striving to preserve world peace." The second task was to work for "China's
reunification" with Taiwan. The last, and "core of the three major tasks," was to
"step up the drive for China's four modernizations."96 He would later identify
modernization as the "essential condition for solving both our domestic and
external problems."97 Moreover, "to attain these two goals, we need two
conditions: a peaceful international environment and political stability and unity
at home." These goals are echoed throughout Deng's works as the decade
progressed. In May 1984 Deng remarked:
China's foreign policy can be summed up in two sentences. First,
to safeguard world peace we oppose hegemony. Second, China
will always belong to the Third World...China's foreign policy is
independent and truly non-aligned...the aim of our foreign policy is
world peace. 98
These comments continued to reflect the influence of and the "three worlds"
view as Deng placed emphasis upon China's solidarity with the Third World. His
concern for the establishment of a "new international economic order" also
revealed the Neo-Marxist concern with global resource and income disparities.
Deng in the early-to-mid 1980s frequently drew attention to the "North-South
problem" and called for greater "South-South cooperation." The tenor of Deng's
pro-Third World rhetoric gradually changed, however, as the realities of "great
power" status, such as responsibilities on the U.N. Security Council, and the
requirements of development pushed the PRC towards the West.
96 Deng Vol II, 224-5.




We feel that although the danger of war still exists and we still have
to remain vigilant, the factors that can prevent a new world war are
growing. Our foreign policy is to oppose hegemonism and
safeguard world peace...We have made some substantive
progress in improving relations with the United States. We are also
trying to improve relations with the Soviet Union, while sticking to
our principles...The last thing China wants is war...Since we want a
peaceful environment, we must cooperate with all of the world's
forces for peace". 99
In 1986, Deng remarked that "we believe that there is not, and cannot be,
any centre in the international communist movement."100 Further, statements in
1989 and 1990 would verify that, while still encouraging an emerging
multipolarity, PRC support for the Third World had become only symbolic. To
the president of Uganda he would remark:
Hegemonists and imperialists always bully the developing
countries... If a big developing country like China still has to
safeguard its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, it
is obvious that the other developing countries of the third World will
have a hard time maintaining their sovereignty and independence.
They should therefore unite to struggle together...We are not rich
and cannot offer you much financial help, but we can share our
experiences with our friends. 101
Deng would later confirm the change in strategy in a talk to leading
members of the CCP Central Committee:
The current situation is more complex and chaotic than in the
past...Some developing countries would like China to become the
leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that...We
cannot afford to do it and besides, we aren't strong enough. There
is nothing to be gained by playing that role; we would only lose
most of our initiative. We do not fear anyone, but we should not
give offense to anyone either. We should act in accordance with











In December 1989 and the aftermath of Tiananmen, Deng would again
sound another prominent theme - that of China's "national sovereignty and
security." He would claim that on the "pretext of human rights concerns," some
Western countries were attempting to "play power politics" to "jeopardize our
national sovereignty." Making reference to China's suffering since the Opium
Wars, Deng stated that "The Chinese people will never accept any action that
violates the norms of international relations, and they will never yield to outside
pressure."103
Thus while the trend in Chinese foreign and security policy during the
Reform era was away from the revolutionary to a post-revolutionary theme,
issues of nationalism and sovereignty became increasingly important as the
regime fought to maintain control of the forces for change. The result was a
policy that can best be summarized with key phrases from the "28-character
strategy" developed in response to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and
end of he Cold War. These principles include 104
Watch and analyze developments calmly
Secure our own positions
Deal with changes with confidence
Conceal our capacities
Keep a low profile
Never become the leader
Make some contributions
3. The Third Generation
With the official adoption of Deng Xiaoping Theory by the Party, Deng's
vision of China's role in the international order appears basically unchanged. In
March 1997, when questioned about potential changes in foreign policy since the
passing of Deng, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen responded:
China's diplomatic activities are being carried out in accordance
with the policy set out by Deng Xiaoping. The basic goal of the





modernization drive. The basic tenets of that policy include:
safeguarding world peace, opposing hegemonism, promoting
international cooperation and seeking common development.
Though Deng has passed away, his policies will be inherited and
remain unchanged. 105
Chinese Premier Li Peng added during a speech in Tokyo in November
1997:
China is committing itself to building a modern socialism. The 15th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China held
recently...defining Deng Xiaoping's Theory as our guiding ideology,
electing a new central leadership with Jiang Zemin at the core, and
drawing up the blueprint for China's future development. Our goal
is to achieve basic modernization by the middle of the next century.
To achieve that we need to secure a long-term peaceful
international environment and maintain good relations with
surrounding countries. China is a staunch force safeguarding
world peace. China's development will pose no threat to any other
country. China will never seek hegemony even when it becomes
developed in the future. China upholds an independent foreign
policy of peace and attaches great importance to developing good
relations with surrounding countries. 106
In a 1992 official statement at the United Nations, the PRC outlined its
goals in the new world order. These goals are summarized as:
• All countries are equal, sovereign members of the international
community entitled to participate on an equal footing.
• Every country has the right to chose independently its own social,
political, and economic systems and course of development in light of its
specific conditions.
• There must be mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. No
country should invade or annex the territory of other countries under any
pretext.
• In order to attain common development and prosperity for all the
countries on the world, the economic exchanges among countries
should be carried out on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, a just
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international economic relationship should be established, and the
assistance should be supplied without attaching any political
conditions. 107
Turning to the perspective of the core leader, and during his 1997 state
visit to the U.S., Jiang Zemin emphasized "four strategic Chinese traditions" in
speech at Harvard. Highlights included:
• The tradition of solidarity and unity. People of all nationalities have
worked together to establish economic and cultural links and joined
hands in developing the vast land of our country. Despite occasional
division in Chinese history, ethnic harmony and national unity have
remained the main stream in the history of the Chinese nation, and an
important guarantee for China's development and progress.
• The tradition of maintaining independence. Our ancestors always
regarded the spirit of maintaining independence as the foundation of a
nation.
• The peace-loving tradition. Today, the Chinese people who are
committed to modernization need more than ever a long-term
international environment of peace and a favorable neighboring
environment. China's foreign policy is peace-oriented. We will
establish and develop friendly relations and cooperation with all
countries in the world on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, especially the principles of mutual respect, equality and
mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
We all never impose upon others the kind of sufferings we once
experienced...China will never seek hegemony even if it is developed
in the future.
• The tradition of constantly striving for self-perfection. Through
observing the changing nature of the universe and all earthly matters,
ancient Chinese philosophers proposed the following doctrine: 'As
Heaven maintains vigor through movement, a gentleman should
constantly strive for self-perfection.' This idea has become an
important moral strength, spurring the Chinese people to work hard for
reform and renovation. 108
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Jiang's comments again echo the broad themes sounded by Deng
throughout the Reform era, placing stability over struggle and reform over
revolution. The final point could just as easily have included a quote from Mao
explaining the inevitable growth and change of "thought and practice" in
dialectical terms. The shifting of fundamental ideological tenets and resultant
modification in practice is portrayed as simply the process of identifying and
resolving the correct primary contradiction. Through this process societies grow
and change, a normal movement toward "self-perfection." However, some
aspects of Chinese foreign policy have remained relatively constant.
E. CONTINUITIES
Despite the reassessment and reordering of major ideological concepts
central to the Chinese world-view, several key themes have remained
remarkably consistent. These concepts cut across the domestic and
international arenas and represent basic principles to which the CCP leadership
clings. The predominance of these themes reflect the complex interaction of a
number of factors introduced here but which are expanded upon through the
remainder of the study. These concepts include:
• Political independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Despite
the fact that most countries consider these issues implicit109 , the
prominence of these concepts in PRC rhetoric undoubtedly reflect the
lingering influence of the "century of shame" beginning in the mid-1
9
th
century at the hands of western and Japanese imperialists. More
immediately, it is suggested that appeals to these themes, along with
supporting policies, are attempts by the Party to bolster regime
legitimacy and survival.
• Anti-imperialism. Whether economic or social, this theme has become
less pronounced in recent years but continues to influence policy,
especially in the PRC's calls for a "new economic order." Developing
countries are portrayed as continuing to suffer from the influence of
this capitalist phenomena.
109 See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979), 17.
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• Support for developing countries. China has maintained this support,
even though it is more moral than material since late 1970s. There is
certainly no longer a hint of revolutionary Marxism, but rather a focus
upon the more "just international economic relationship" in which the
developed countries are obligated to assist the undeveloped. Calls for
an effort to "assist the oppressed" are somewhat self-serving as well,
given China's self-assigned label as a developing country.
• Nationalism. Appeals to this theme have become more prominent as
appeals to the dogmatic elements of official ideology have become
less so. The Third generation's emphasis on "patriotism" is likely
another effort to overcome a fragile political legitimacy by linking
China's domestic program and foreign policy with the larger strategic
objective of building a rich country and strong army that will allow
China to assume its rightful place as a global power. The nature this
concept assumes may ultimately determine the degree of
aggressiveness China asserts in external relations.
• Socialism over bourgeois liberalization. This theme is highlighted,
though primarily of a domestic nature, to emphasize the Party's
determination to stay the course as defined by the Four Cardinal
Principles. Central to regime survival, the Party continues to mute the
pressure for movement toward political liberalization, despite external
criticism.
One study suggests that "until China's leaders are able to regain a sense
of public mandate for its leadership, it will not be inclined to compromise on what
they regard as the core issues of foreign and national security policy."110 These
concepts will figure prominently in considering prospects for the future.
F. SUMMARY - THE DIALECTIC AT WORK
This chapter has examined the evolution of major ideological concepts
considered most likely to have influenced the perceptions of PRC foreign policy-
makers. It has explored how the Chinese leadership shifted from the single-
minded concern with political-strategic considerations to a more complete
approach to national interests, embracing the importance of economic
development and social stability. Broadly, this evolution has occurred within the
110 1997 Strategic Review. Online. Available: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa97/sa97ch4.html. 5
March 1998.
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framework of the dialectic reasoning process so significant to Chinese
Communism, and reflects the ongoing effort to achieve a synthesis between the
dogmatism reflected in the "two whatevers" and the more pragmatic approach of
"seeking truth from facts." Figure 3 summarizes the transition of key concepts.






















Figure 3. Evolving Key Concepts
This incredible transition has been explored from a variety of angles.
Quansheng Zhao, for example, posits that shifting priorities to modernization and
increase openness were encouraged by several developments during the 1970s
and 1980s. These include a greater sense of Party self-confidence as the
domestic situation was consolidated, a growing sense of international legitimacy
in the years following its replacement of Taiwan as the sole Chinese
representative in the U.N., and the fact that many countries surrounding China
had experienced rapid economic growth with relative political stability,
encouraging fundamental changes in Beijing's interpretation of the requirements
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of national strength and survival. 111 Thomas Robinson argues that the CCP has
realized that its time in power as a Marxist-Leninist entity is limited, and,
therefore, it must adopt other concepts to promote its political legitimacy. 112
Recognizing that the transformation outlined above is the result of an interaction
of many factors, there are elements of truth in each.
However, there seems to be a lesser effort at understanding the role of
the Chinese cognitive processes at work in official China. John Bryan Starr
provides a good start point by describing the fundamental difference between the
Chinese Communist and Western approaches to the "three-stage process of
cognition."113 He argues that in the Chinese approach to the relationship of
"theory and practice," the Chinese cognitive process approximates "practice-
theory-practice" rather than "theory-practice-theory" common in western
philosophy. Thus reasoning begins not with abstraction but with concrete
problems, or more accurately contradictions, which require resolution. Further,
according to Starr, the Chinese objective of the cognitive process is action for
change, not mere understanding. Combined with the conceptual flexibility of
dialectic reasoning, therefore, the Chinese Communist have an "eminently
pragmatic ideology."
Franz Schurmann suggests that what is extraordinary about this manner
of thinking is its simplicity. 114 Having accepted "a few basic philosophical
premises from Marxism-Leninism," it proceeds to combine ideas into a never-
ending series of dualities. These over-arching philosophical premises are
termed "pure ideology" by Schurmann and are further described as "a set of
ideas designed to give the individual a unified and conscious world view."
Practical ideology, on the other hand, is a set of ideas designed to "give the
individual rational instruments for action." And while the pure ideology of the
111 Zhao, 51-54.
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CCP consists of a fixed set of universal ideas, its practical ideology consists of
an ever-changing and ever-expanding set of particular ideas, derived from the
dialectic combination of ideological thinking with concrete problems. That some
combinations may have been wrong or useless makes little difference, since the
products of such thinking will always be particular, not universal, ideas. The
manner of thinking, and not necessarily its particular products, will always be
universal and true.
Not only has it evolved, but it appears official ideology has assumed a
different role in the PRC as well. During the Revolutionary era, all policies and
programs had to measure up to or even sprang from official ideology. Official
ideology now appears to provide the general parameters, or principles, for
governmental policies. Marxism as seen through the lens of Deng Xiaoping
Theory appears to embody principles such as social equality, common
prosperity, sovereignty, and independence, while allowing the technical details
for accomplishing these ends to conform to those widely adopted elsewhere.
This appears to be the essence of "learning truth from facts."
G. CONCLUSION
The Chinese Communist's utilitarian conception of theory and practice has
allowed official ideology to evolve to meet the changing needs of the CCP. As
certain dogmatic elements became obsolete, the intrinsically dynamic nature of
dialectic thinking allowed the flexibility to move toward more a more pragmatic
approach rather than reject the philosophy that had always guided the Party to
victory in the Revolution. This process, however, was not without internal
conflict, and the "new" theory took the better part of a decade to acquire a sense
of widespread legitimacy within the Party.
The central themes of this evolution, as depicted above, have been
prominent in the works of the core leader. And given the highly centralized
nature of the Chinese foreign policy decision-making, the transition from a
revolutionary to post-revolutionary state is almost certain to have a tremendous
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impact upon the PRC's behavior in the international system. The case study that




III. OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY AND PRC FOREIGN POLICY
The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so
that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
Sun Tzu
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter explored the evolution of key ideological concepts
most influential to PRC foreign and security policy. These included key domestic
priorities and leadership perceptions of the characteristics of the international
environment and China's role within it. This chapter develops more fully the
linkage between official ideology and the PRC's international behavior. In doing
so, the case study examines four significant foreign policy decisions that
occurred from 1965 to 1996 and focuses upon PRC relations with the U.S. and
former Soviet Union. Specifically, it considers:
• PRC support for the Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam from
1965-68
• The Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1 969
• The Sino-Soviet rapprochement in 1989 and border demarcation in
1991
• The Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996
This approach is taken in light of the primacy of Sino-American and Sino-
Soviet relations to PRC leadership. Thomas Robinson posits that "so long as
Chinese policy focused primarily on the U.S. and USSR, many other aspects of
Beijing's foreign relations tended to follow." 115 While this assessment reflects a
Cold War strategic mentality, it appears accurate for much of the period under
analysis and underscores the importance of current and future PRC relations
with the United States and Russia Also, selected episodes primarily feature
decision-making in external use of force circumstances in keeping with the focus
on PRC security policy.
115 Robinson, "Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s,", in Chinese Foreign Policy:
Theory and Practice, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 563.
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B. PRC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FROM 1965-68
1 . Course of Events
In February 1965, the United States began a program of air strikes known
as Operation Rolling Thunder against military targets in the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (North Vietnam). This campaign was designed to hinder the North's
material and psychological support to the communist insurgency in the Republic
of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The U.S. military effort was expanded in March by
the introduction of ground forces in South Vietnam when two battalions of U.S.
Marines came ashore. By July 1965, the Johnson administration had decided to
deploy 75,000 U.S. troops to full-scale ground combat operations in South
Vietnam. Later that year, American expeditionary forces numbered some
180,000. This escalation, following years of steadily increasing military and
economic support, prompted a decision by Beijing to begin more extensive
support of its "brotherly comrades" in North Vietnam. Accordingly, in September
1965, PLA railway engineer and construction battalions together with anti-aircraft
divisions began deployment into Vietnam. The PRC also granted $110-200
million (estimated) worth of military and economic aid to Hanoi. 116 This support
continued until mid-1968, when these forces withdrew after President Johnson
had reduced the level and area of bombing in exchange for Hanoi's agreement
to peace negotiations in Paris.
During the PLA presence in North Vietnam (and Laos), U.S. aircraft and
Chinese ground forces repeatedly exchanged fire despite intentions in both
capitals of minimizing the chances of direct confrontation. The Chinese repaired
bridges, roads, and rail lines between Hanoi and its southern border following
American attacks. They also constructed a large base in northwest Vietnam that
included a 5,000 foot runway and more than 100 buildings which were protected
by anti-aircraft guns on rails throughout the adjacent hills. A 1979 People's Daily
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article claimed that a total of 320,000 troops served in Vietnam during the nearly
three year period, with units rotated through to gain combat experience.
Chinese casualties were placed at 20,000 with 1,000 dead remaining in Vietnam.
Beijing's announcements during the war correctly reported a dozen U.S. planes
shot down over China. 117
2. Analysis
Based on logical inference, combined with a basic understanding of
events in 20th Asia and CCP ideology, it would seem inconceivable that China
would fail to support, in some capacity, North Vietnam's revolutionary effort.
After all, twice in the previous 15 years the PRC had committed military forces
beyond its borders in support of national interests. The first was on the Korean
peninsula in support of communist North Korea against "U.S. aggression," and
the second against India in a border conflict involving disputes over the extreme
western and eastern sectors of their shared border in Xizang province (Tibet). In
Vietnam, like in Korea, Beijing once again perceived a neighboring communist
regime under attack by U.S imperialist forces. Further, not only was China's
identity as an Asian and communist power at stake, but Beijing perceived that
the fall of North Vietnam to a government friendly to the U.S. could eventually
make China's southern border vulnerable to invasion by Nationalist forces from
Taiwan. Thus the PRC clearly had ideological and practical security justification
to pursue this policy. The Peking Review in February 1965 would declare:
The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam is a member of the socialist
camp and all other socialist countries have the unshirkable
international obligation to support and assist it with actual deeds. 118
A closer examination, however, reveals that the PRC by the mid-1960s
was in a very different situation than when it committed the PLA against U.N.
116 King C. Chen, "China and the Indochina Crisis," in The Role of External Powers in the
Indochina Crisis, ed. Gene T. Hsiao (New York: Andronicus Publishing Co., 1973), 65-67.
117 Cited in Allen S. Whiting, "Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy," in Chinese Foreign Policy:
Theory and Practice, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 515-16.
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forces in Korea. Not only had the PRC leadership's ideological perceptions of
the international order begun to change radically, but the dynamic nature of the
PRC domestic scene might have mitigated other motives for commitment of
forces. Specifically, China's relations with Vietnam were complicated by the
formers' growing dispute with the Soviet Union and the complex internal political
conflict which would lead to the Cultural Revolution. This interplay of external
and internal events and perceptions led to a significant shift in China's
relationship with North Vietnam during the 1960s and its levels of support for that
country's war efforts. In this event, the primary focus will be on the influence of
the domestic dimension in shaping Chinese security decisions.
Following the Geneva Agreement on Indochina of 1954, and with a focus
on domestic problems as well as a desire to minimize the chance of another U.S.
military intervention in Asia, the Beijing leadership neither hindered nor
encouraged Hanoi's efforts to "liberate" the South by military means until 1962.
Until that time, and when questioned formally by the Vietnamese Politburo about
strategies of the "Southern revolution," Beijing reportedly responded by
emphasizing the importance of socialist revolution and reconstruction in the
North. 119 Beijing would go on to suggest that Hanoi should adopt in the South a
strategy of "not exposing our own forces for a long period, accumulating our own
strength, establishing connections with the masses, and waiting for the coming of
proper opportunities."120 This apparent lack of enthusiasm toward a more
aggressive revolutionary struggle by their Vietnamese comrades suggests the
Chinese leaders had become consumed by the domestic crisis associated with
policies of the Great Leap Forward.
Realizing the Soviet model of industrial growth was not suitable for China,
the Great Leap Forward had represented Mao's vision for achieving economic
118
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and social modernity by leaping over the preliminary stages of development
anticipated by socialism. This idea rested on Mao's faith in "mind over matter"
and belief that the masses possessed great latent productive power if properly
motivated and mobilized to action. Its influence touched almost all aspects of
Chinese society: the countryside was organized into giant agricultural
communes intended to be self-sufficient; urban society and industrial concerns
were reorganized into small production units emphasizing egalitarianism and
increased output at the expense of quality and investment; and the military
abandoned Soviet manuals for their own while de-emphasizing professionalism
in favor of guerrilla war traditions. The result was disorganization, dislocation,
and eventual national tragedy as roughly thirty million people died of famine in
1 960-61. 121
Issues surrounding these domestic developments are significant to this
case for two reasons. First, the adoption of this domestic developmental
program represented an abandonment of Soviet leadership and contributed to
the hostile split between the two allies as described later in this study. Second,
the CCP leadership splintered over the appropriate response to the disaster,
eventually influencing Chinese policy in Vietnam and contributing to the initiation
of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution.
The details of Party efforts to correct for Great Leap failures are beyond
the scope of this study. Critical, however, is that two agendas emerged within
the Party in the early 1960s. Many leaders, like Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and
Chen Yun, favored more pragmatic economic policies, expert management, and
individual responsibility to regain social stability and get development back on
track. Mao and his supporters, by contrast, became obsessed with the fear that
the appeal to material concerns would undermine the emphasis on revolution. 122
This fear was exaggerated by evolving relations with the USSR and the




refocused the Party upon "class struggle" and called for a renewed ideological
emphasis, thus launching the "two-lines struggle" between the revolutionaries
and reformers and a "socialist education" movement across the country.
Kenneth Lieberthal argues that the resulting mix of policies was
schizophrenic. 123 While more practical economic policies from 1962-65 brought
about a remarkably rapid recovery, mass campaigns advocated ideological
commitment to egalitarianism and class struggle along with denouncements of
internal and external enemies linked to the United States and Soviet Union. Mao
had also dictated the start of a new program of economic investment deep in the
interior of the country called the "third line" or "third front" intended to provide
strategic depth in the event of war with the United States if hostilities in Vietnam
continued to escalate.
Against this backdrop, and even with the lukewarm response to Hanoi's
earlier request for assistance in the Vietnamese revolution, Beijing incrementally
expanded its security commitment to North Vietnam through 1967 when PLA
forces reached a peak of 1 70,000. 124 Further, Zhou Enlai in December 1965
would underscore the PRC resolve by stating:
The Chinese people have long been prepared. Should U.S.
imperialism insist on going further along the road of war expansion
and having another trial of strength with the Chinese people, we
will resolutely take up the challenge and fight to the end...the
Chinese people will unswervingly side with the fraternal
Vietnamese people and contribute all our efforts to the defeat of
U.S. imperialism until final victory. 125
What factors were dominant in this change of heart? Certainly Beijing's
decision to actively support North Vietnam had its own logic and a plethora of
considerations. The impact and threat of imperialism had been central to the







committed its forces to the fight and risked direct confrontation with the United
States are outlined by King Chen. 126 He posits that by mid-1965, Beijing held a
different view on global strategy than either the Soviets or the North Vietnamese.
In light of the collapse of the "two camps" model of world revolution and
"Khrushchev revisionism," Beijing had rejected the concept of "unified action" on
the part of a single communist movement, and had begun to assert its position
as the role model for communist revolution in the world. 127 Consequently, it saw
a significant advantage in the continuation and participation of the war; it served
as a model for the war of national liberation in the Third World, undermined a
possible American-Soviet detente, created domestic anti-war disturbances and
economic difficulties in the United States, and aroused anti-U.S. sentiment
abroad. 128
In keeping with the focus upon the domestic factor, however, Beijing's
policy of "forward attack" in Vietnam also provided Mao the justification for
increased emphasis on political and social mobilization at home. Despite the
failures of the Great Leap Forward, Mao remained firmly committed to
revolutionizing the CCP and remaking Chinese society. Thus, not only did the
Vietnamese revolution conform to Beijing's evolving world view and perceived
role in the strategic environment, but it supported Mao's domestic ideological
agenda as well. Keenly aware of the strong psychological effect of the
perception of China facing a serious external imperialist threat, Mao used foreign
policy to facilitate the mobilization effort and strengthened his hand in the
ideological confrontation with other senior leaders in the Party.
The strategic challenge lay in finding the right balance of support to
achieve the desired domestic result while minimizing the risk of direct military
125
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confrontation with the United States. This consideration likely prompted the
decision to commit primarily combat support troops and ground-based air
defense units in the North Vietnam while avoiding the more aggressive posture
of committing combat troops and Chinese aircraft to provide advanced air cover.
Intentional efforts at communicating the PLA presence and disposition in North
Vietnam to American intelligence through aerial photography and electronic
intercepts were also interpreted as attempt to lessen the chance for direct
engagement and deter a U.S. invasion of the North. 129
3. Conclusion
The ideological factor played a key role in guiding China's military
involvement in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese struggle increasingly conformed
to Beijing's world view as it evolved through the 1960s, supported Mao's
ideologically motivated efforts to rebuild Chinese society, and served to anchor
the revolutionary mindset in power politics at the center. At the same time, the
intervention was tempered by the realities of the nuclear age. While compelled
to support another communist regime and developing country in its struggle
against imperialism, China took pains to avoid direct confrontation with the
United States. Even though Beijing would ultimately break ranks with North
Vietnam over the decision to accept peace talks in 1968, it would have to count
its overall strategy in Vietnam a success in that it helped secure the status of a
fellow communist state and deter the United States from further escalating the
war.
C. THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969
1 . Course of Events
This incident, the first involving a direct military clash between the PRC
and the Soviets, involved skirmishes over Zhenbao Island, located on the
Chinese side of the main channel of the Wusuli (Ussuri) River, which
demarcated the Sino-Soviet border. While border disputes between Russia and
129 Whiting, 517.
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China have a long historical tradition, the more immediate causes of this incident
date from the 1964 termination of "consultations" over the existing border
regime, established by the Border Rivers Navigation Agreement of 1951 signed
by the PRC and USSR. 130 This agreement, signed by the PRC at a time of
economic and military dependence, had ceded to the Soviets armed control of
the Wusuli River (among other border rivers) and of more than 600 of the 700
islands located in these strategically important waterways in the extreme
northeastern border region. The consultations, begun in 1962, stalemated over
Chinese claims to large territories in Siberia, demands for recognition of the
"unequal" nature of the historical border arrangement, and issues regarding the
exact borderline. Further, the Soviets were unwilling to relinquish control over
most of the 700 islands in the frontier rivers. Mao's public criticism of Soviet
"imperialism" prompted Khrushchev to suspend the talks in October 1964.
Subsequently, the Chinese became increasingly aggressive in asserting
claims of sovereignty in the border areas, with numerous encroachments by
Chinese fishermen and soldiers in the disputed waterways and islands. Border
incidents increased dramatically, with over 4,000 incidents documented by the
Chinese from 1964 to 1969, though most were minor and handled at the local
level. 131 Simultaneously, the Soviets began a process of reinforcing its military
presence along the Sino-Soviet border, and in 1966 signed a pact with Mongolia
allowing stationing of Soviet troops in strength within that country. 132 By 1967,
China began to match some of the Soviet buildup.
In late January 1969, a serious military clash occurred at Zhenbao Island
which precipitated a more aggressive Chinese tactical posture. Following an
exchange of propaganda barrages and threats, two major clashes occurred in
March. The first was reportedly launched by Chinese forces and resulted in
130 Christian F. Ostermann, "East German Documents on the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969."
Online. Available: www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b6-7a13.htm. 24 April 1998.
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relatively high casualties by the Soviets. In the second, apparently orchestrated
by the Soviets to teach the Chinese a lesson, superior Soviet numbers and
firepower decimated Chinese troops. 133 One report indicates several thousand
troops from each side were involved during this conflict with the PLA suffering at
least 800 casualties, while the Soviets suffered about 90 casualties. 134
Diplomatic maneuvers throughout the following spring and summer
resulted in agreements by both sides to resume river navigation talks but not
before Chinese and Soviet troops had also clashed in Xinjiang. The military
conflict surrounding the issue was finally resolved in October 1969 by a meeting
at the Beijing airport between the two countries' premiers - Zhou Enlai and
Aleksei Kosygin - followed by more lengthy negotiations over the border issues
at the deputy foreign minister level. Nevertheless, this confrontation, along with
other disputes, contributed to the shift in the Chinese external threat perceptions
and ensured a high level of tension existed between the two communist giants
over the next two decades.
2. Analysis
The Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed by China and Russia in 1689, was
China's first formal border treaty. 135 Since that time, the issue of where Russia
meets China has been an important theme in relations between the two
countries. At a deeper level, however, motives for this confrontation go far
beyond issues of territory and sovereignty. One author writes that "it now seems
evident that the border issue was a symptom rather than a cause of heightening
tensions between both countries... both sides, however, found the issue
extremely useful as an instrument in their ideological and power-political
rivalry." 136 This view is underscored by the observation that there seemed to be








incidents were largely firefights between frontier patrols, despite relatively large-
scale re-positioning of conventional forces by both sides, thus emphasizing the
pre-eminently political nature of the crisis.
A great paradox of international relations throughout the 1960s was that
the harshest criticism of Soviet foreign policy emanated from another socialist
power. 138 Ironically, China viewed the Soviet Union as the "most dangerous" of
the two superpowers; a determination which influenced the nature of Beijing's
relations with the rest of the world. Central to this view was the concept of
hegemonism, generally defined as the political and economic expansion of
power and the exercise of control and influence. Mao reasoned that as U.S.
imperialism was being defeated in Asia, the Soviets were taking advantage of
U.S. weakness to strengthen and augment their own position. Beijing, therefore,
increasingly warned Asian leaders to "guard against the tiger (Soviets) at the
back door while expelling the wolf (United States) from the front gate."139
With respect to Sino-Soviet bilateral relations, and complementary to the
developing theme of anti-hegemony, Mao came to contend that there was no
difference whatsoever between "social" and "capitalist" imperialism. This key
concept, which had served to unite his party and army through revolutionary
struggles and civil war, would eventually color his views in later years in relations
with his former major ally. More specifically, Maoist theory indicated that with the
usurpation of party and state power by the "revisionist renegade Khrushchev-
Brezhnev clique," capitalism had been restored in the Soviet Union "in an all
around way." The Soviet Union, "once a socialist state," was reclassified as a
"socialist-imperialist superpower." Moreover, and within the "three worlds model,
Mao saw humankind as divided into "two families." The two "families" consisted
of the exploiting class and the proletariat. There could be no third family.




The rise to power of revisionism means the rise to power of the
bourgeoisie...The Soviet Union today is under the dictatorship of
the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie, a dictatorship
of the German fascist type, a dictatorship of the Hitler type. 140
The change in attitude and ideology obviously did not occur overnight, but
evolved as Mao grew increasingly agitated over Soviet interference, and
influence, in PRC affairs. Soviet criticism, for example, of the Great Leap
Forward and subsequent withdrawal of developmental assistance essentially
formalized the ideological rift. Mao also reportedly watched with growing
apprehension in the late 1950s as the Soviet Union underwent the process of
de-Stalinization. 141 He apparently was fearful not only that the process might
lead to a re-evaluation of other leaders, to include himself, but a repudiation of
ideological principles he considered worthy of respect and emulation.
By January 1962, Mao was ready to state explicitly, though not for public
consumption, that the Party and state leadership in the Soviet Union had been
"usurped by revisionists," thus ending the solidarity between "fraternal parties."142
As relations deteriorated following the suspension of border consultations, Mao
severed party relations with the CPSU in 1966 and reduced communications with
Moscow to low-level contacts. Even state-to-state relations reportedly had little
appeal for Mao. After attempts by the Soviets to expand commercial relations
between the two countries, perceived as an attempt to keep China dependent
upon Soviet industrial expertise, Mao concluded that it was better to deal with
the French bourgeoisie, "who still have some notion of business ethics."143
From the Chinese perspective, the external threat took on a new
dimension in 1968 by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the
proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine. Suddenly, the conflict of ideas assumed
a more militant posture and many senior PRC leaders recognized that greater
139 Cited by Sidky, 8.





vigilance against Moscow was needed. Georg Segal posits that even though
Sino-Soviet relations had steadily deteriorated during the 1960s, Mao probably
never felt particularly vulnerable to actual Soviet aggression until late in the
decade. 144 As a consequence, the Central Military Commission issued a
directive which put the country on "war footing" 145 and the PRC assumed an even
more belligerent tone in its bilateral relations with the Soviets.
A final point relates to the Chinese domestic component of the decision to
initiate the early incident in March. Several domestic issues might have
influenced Chinese actions in this incident. First, and by far the most important,
China was in the midst of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. The
influence of this period upon the decision-making institutions in the PRC, while
too complex to analyze here, cannot be overemphasized. Another brewing issue
revolved around succession politics, which eventually led to Defense Minister Lin
Biao's challenge to Mao's rule, and increasing factional intrigue. Finally, and
identical to the logic associated with PRC policy in North Vietnam, the
presentation of an imminent external threat was likely seen by Beijing as
advantageous in mobilizing the population to achieve domestic ideological goals.
While it would be difficult to outline a definitive theory regarding the influence of
the domestic situation, perhaps the most important dimension may be the over-
arching sense of domestic unrest which heightened the sense of vulnerability on
the part of Chinese leaders. 146
3. Conclusion
Ideological estrangement between the two belligerents was the primary
motivator for the dispute, magnifying differences over territory, sovereignty,
strategy, and security. Further, the ideological conflict was not an abstract








foreign policy that affected the distribution of power and authority inside China
and within the international communist movement. Evolving Soviet security
policy in the late 1960s likely provided the final incentive for the PRC to assume
a very aggressive military posture in an attempt to display political independence
and sovereignty.
D. SINO-SOVIET RAPPROACHMENT IN 1989 AND BORDER
DEMARCATION IN 1991
1 . Course of Events
On May 15, 1989, the long-awaited summit that marked the normalization
of relations between China and the Soviet Union took place in Beijing. This
event marked the culmination of steadily improving relations between the two
socialist powers since 1982, and signaled the end of an era that had helped
define international politics for a quarter century. 147 Mikhail Gorbachev, general
secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and president of the Supreme Soviet,
visited China and held talks with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, who described
the summit as "ending the past and opening the future." Further, to the Chinese,
the changing relationship was finally placed in the context of the "principles of
peaceful co-existence" which it claimed to apply in all its international relations. 148
Normalization brought new impetus to the development of bilateral ties.
Bilateral exchanges in the political, economic, trade, science and technology,
and military sectors increased markedly. Premier Li Peng visited the Soviet
Union in April 1990 to sign inter-governmental agreements on reducing the
military presence and establishing building confidence measures along the Sino-
Soviet border and another on long-term cooperation in economy, science, and
technology. During a visit to Moscow in May 1991 by Jiang Zemin, general
secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, both sides reiterated their desire to
147 Steven I. Levine, "The Uncertain Future of Chinese Foreign Policy," Current History
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further expand ties and pledged to respect the choice of social systems made by
the citizens of the other country.
Also during this visit, and of specific interest to this study, is the
agreement signed ending the dispute over the eastern section of shared borders
between the countries. The agreement specified that demarcation would follow
international guidelines by adopting the thalweg of river as the dividing line for
their common border, and recognized that Zhenbao Island was Chinese territory.
The two parliaments ratified the agreement in February 1992, and instruments of
ratification were exchanged in March. Further border demarcation efforts were
subsequently implemented. The resolution of the border issue, a long-standing
obstacle to better relations between the PRC and Soviet Union, paved the way
for more extensive cooperation between China and Russia, which declared itself




The border demarcation efforts of the late 1980s provide an interesting
focal point, in light of the conflict discussed above, in considering evolving Sino-
Soviet relations and PRC security policy well into the Reform era. What
conditions had changed to allowed a peaceful resolution of this issue? Certainly
this historic development involves a host of complicated international and
domestic factors in both countries that cannot be treated adequately here. In
fact, the evolution in Sino-Soviet relations were undoubtedly influenced as much,
maybe even more, by developments in the former Soviet Union than in the PRC.
The study focuses, however, upon Chinese political and strategic considerations
and the ideological component.
The Soviet Union had been China's principal security threat since the late-
1960s. For nearly two decades, China had been obsessed with several major
aspects of the perceived Soviet threat. The first was the effects of the




strategic encirclement caused by its lengthy border with the USSR as well as
Moscow's "alliance" or support of Hanoi and New Delhi, both of which had
territorial disputes and other traditional animosities with Beijing. 150 The Soviet
influence in North Korea as well as the large troop concentrations along the
Sino-Soviet border also contributed to perceived efforts to destabilize China's
periphery. Finally, the threat posed by Soviet nuclear missiles, including the SS-
20 intermediate-range missiles, had significantly influenced Chinese security
policy and defense preparations. 151
Most analysis indicates, however, that conditions conducive to
reconciliation between the two countries had begun to take shape in the early
1980s, and actually had its roots in the "economic warming" of that period. 152
Chinese bilateral trade with USSR in 1976-80, for example, had increased 276
percent over the comparable period a decade earlier, and continued to increase
rapidly. 153 With the succession issue largely settled in China and Deng's plan for
economic reform and "opening to the world" endorsed by the Twelfth Party
Congress in 1982, PRC leadership had begun mulling over the prospects for a
long-term peace and reductions in military expenditures. Deng had realized that
economic modernization would require an influx of foreign capital and technology
and, therefore, a foreign policy that would ensure access to markets and
resources of many countries, regardless of political system. In fact, Deng
himself confirmed the domestic-economic foreign policy linkage by stating:
"when we decided on the domestic policy of (economic) construction, we adjust
our foreign policy (accordingly)."154
Several years later in the Soviet Union, and assuming that its stagnant
economy could only be revived by reducing international hostility and reducing
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the size of its military, Gorbachev's "perestroika" was intended to place the
Soviet Union on the path toward economic reform that in many ways paralleled
China's. Moscow reportedly was interested in paring down its planned economy
and in China's use of "special economic zones" and joint ventures. 155
Still, ideological considerations factored heavily in bilateral relations. It
was not, for example, until the Soviets displayed a willingness to address China's
"three obstacles" to improved relations that Beijing would officially move forward
in this area. Specifically, Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, support to Vietnam
in Cambodia, and troop concentrations along the Sino-Soviet border were
perceived by Beijing as classic hegemonic behavior and a lingering symptom of
Soviet imperialist tendencies. Gorbachev's July 1986 speech in Vladivostok
signaled Moscow's willingness to begin negotiating these key issues, and during
the course of 1988, these were satisfied by a number of Soviet diplomatic
initiatives. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was begun in the spring of
1988 and completed on schedule in February 1989. China and the Soviet Union
had agreed to pursue a political settlement to the Cambodian issue and reduce
aid to their respective clients, and Gorbachev had announced in a speech at the
United Nations in December that the Soviet Union would withdraw most of its
troops from Mongolia. 156 Finally, the INF treaty signed in December 1987 by the
United States and Soviet Union helped lessen the fear of nuclear warfare.
Given these developments, and from the Chinese perspective, efforts to
move forward with normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and resolution of the
border issue were finally possible. In fact, improved relations with the Soviets
had been considered increasingly beneficial by CCP leadership for several major
reasons. First, it significantly reduced anxiety over the security threat along
China's northern border, thus allowing Beijing to rein in the military budget
essential to the economic reform effort. Second, it substantiated China's claim to
an "independent" foreign policy, facilitating China's diplomatic maneuvering
155 Hsiung, 247.
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between Moscow and Washington. This was especially important given the
"quiet crisis" brewing in China's relations with the U.S. in the late 1980s. 157
Tensions with the U.S. had been steadily mounting over human rights issues in
Tibet, trade problems, and reports of Chinese arms sales to Iran. All this was
against a background of condemnations by the United States Congress and
sanctions imposed by the Reagan Administration. 158 Third, it opened an
additional potential source of foreign aid and assistance to the modernization
effort.
159
Finally, and just as important, an important link in the socialist world was
reestablished at a time when the younger generation in China had already
expressed, quite vividly in fact at Tiananmen Square in June 1989, deep
skepticism about the alleged superiority of socialism and leadership of the Party.
Therefore at one level, rapprochement was encouraged by a sense of renewed
ideological compatibility, with the CCP leadership hoping to bolster its fading
political legitimacy. In fact, this connection proved to be of dubious value as
events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe unfolded over the next couple of
years. By early 1990, Chinese leaders sensed another ideological threat in the
Gorbachev reforms. The Soviet leader's decision to amend the constitutional
provision which required the political dominance of the Communist Party was in
direct contradiction to Deng's "Four Cardinal Principles" for the development of
socialism in China. An internal Party document, in fact, accused Gorbachev of
being a "traitor to the socialist cause" and labeled his line a "total betrayal of the
fundamental precepts of Marxism-Leninism."160
3. Conclusion
An examination of the economic incentives and strategic environment









tension with its neighbors. Still, and even though the Party had abandoned or
re-evaluated much of its Maoist dogma for a more pragmatic approach, several
basic tenets of official ideology served to temper the forces for improved
relations between the PRC and USSR. Most critical was Beijing's view of
lingering Soviet hegemonic behavior throughout the region. However, once
Moscow displayed a willingness to modify its international conduct in this regard,
or at least the more overt aspects, the ideological constraints to improved
relations were minimized. Hopes for a renewed socialist "solidarity," however,
were quickly dispelled as Gorbachev lost control of his own reform processes
and the USSR collapsed.
E. TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS IN 1996
1. Course of Events
In June 1995, Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui paid an "unofficial visit"
to the U.S. to attend a class reunion of his alma mater, Cornell University. Also
in that month, Taiwanese Premier Lien Chan made a "private trip" to Austria and
the Czech Republic. It represented the first trip to Europe by a top leader from
Taiwan. Subsequently, Beijing announced the suspension of cross-strait talks
with Taiwan, and in July 1995, that the PLA would conduct a series of missile
exercises just north of Taipei. From 22-24 July 1995, China conducted the first
round of missile exercises into waters north of Taiwan, firing six surface-to-
surface tactical ballistic missiles. A second round of exercises were conducted
in early August during which Beijing declared an area 50 times larger than the
first exercise off limits, effectively amounting to a partial blockade of Taiwan.
The ten-day exercise, which included anti-ship cruise missiles, eventually
included the firing of live artillery. The exercises are credited with interrupting
shipping and aviation in and around the Straits as well as influencing fluctuations
in the Taiwanese stock market. 161 The exercise was concluded amid a barrage
of harsh statements from both sides of the Straits but minimal interference from
73
forces outside China. The situation remained tense for the remainder of the
year.
In February 1996, the PRC began positioning significant forces along the
coastline of the southeastern Fujian Province facing Taiwan. These forces
reportedly included some 150,000 troops, an increase in warplanes by 88 to a
total of 226 deployed at various airfields, and four amphibious landing craft to the
Fujian port of Xiamen and Pingtan. 162 Following this redeployment, Beijing in
March reported that the PLA would stage a new series of missile exercises in the
Taiwan Straits from 8 to 15 March, and would employ surface-to-surface missiles
in two target areas; one site northeast of Taiwan about 21 miles from the port of
Keelung, and the other 32 miles west of the southern port of Kaohsiung, which
together handle approximately 70 percent of Taiwan's external trade. The
exercise was also scheduled to include military maneuvers in a 6,600-square-
mile zone that stretched to the mid-point of the Taiwan Strait which would
partially obstruct shipping and air traffic as in 1995. Taiwan responded by
placing its 400,000 member military on heightened alert as the exercise began
according to schedule.
The PRC exercises evoked a significant international response, especially
in the United States. On March 10, Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
referring to China's actions as "reckless," announced the dispatch of a carrier
battle group led by the USS Independence to the waters off Taiwan. White
House spokesman James Fetig declared the exercise a "provocative act," while
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich labeled it an "an act of terror." The next
day, President Clinton authorized the reinforcement of the Independence group
by sending the USS Nimitz carrier battle group into the area. A statement by
l6
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U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appealed for restraint by all
parties to the crisis. 163
In an apparent response to PRC exercises, and following Taiwan's
presidential and National Assembly elections in late March, Taiwan's Defense
Minister Chiang Chung-ling announced Taiwan would conduct military exercises
in its front-line Matsu Islands in early April, yet subsequently postponed these
plans in a presumed effort to ease tensions in the region.
2. Analysis
While PRC leadership would vehemently oppose the consideration of its
policies with regard to cross-strait relations as foreign policy, it certainly would fail
under the purview of Chinese security policy. The U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relationship
is widely regarded as one of the most potentially destabilizing issues in the
region. This study will not retrace the entire development of the Taiwan issue in
U.S.-PRC strategic relations, but will look to the immediate causes of the 1996
incident and consider the influence of CCP ideology.
The Communists came to power following a long revolutionary struggle
which drew heavily upon nationalistic themes. Moreover, Mao declared that
"China had stood up" and promised the reestablishment of territorial integrity and
an end to foreign interference in the nation's domestic affairs. Throughout the
years the PRC has achieved gradual but significant successes, such as the
return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and anticipated return of
Macao in 1999. At the same time, there remains a small island some one
hundred miles across the Taiwan Straits, rightfully Chinese, which maintains
international political and economic relations as if it were an independent
country. This situation serves as a constant reminder to the Party and entire
mainland of the humiliations and struggles of the past. More specifically, it
suggests an incomplete civil war and national revolution, and is perceived as
contributing to the erosion of Party authority and legitimacy. Accordingly, and to
163 Quotes cited in "Chronology of Recent Events in U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations."
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justify its nationalistic credentials, the CCP feels strongly that it must reclaim this
"renegade province" and put an end to its independent behavior in the
international arena. Because the United States has provided significant support
to the Nationalists on Taiwan since the end of the Chinese civil war, the status of
the island has played a central role in U.S-Sino relations over the years.
With this background, cross-strait relations became increasingly tense
during the early 1990s under the polices of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's,
who assumed power following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. Focusing
on the diplomatic front, Lee began pursuing new forms of international
recognition for Taiwan using an approach labeled "pragmatic diplomacy."
The essence of this policy was described in the spring of 1996 by
Kuomintang Secretary-General Hsu Shui-teh:
As a pragmatist, President Li has been sparing no effort to
implement pragmatic diplomacy since taking office to win national
dignity and to raise international profile. Up to now, we have
achieved the following in international relations: (1) up to the end
of 1995, the ROC maintained formal ties with 30 countries, an
increase of seven over 1985. We set up consular and trade offices
in 61 countries, up 23 from 1985. (2) we sought to take part in
activities of APEC, GATT and WTO. (3) from 1990 to 1995, we
contributed US$2.9 billion to disaster relief in the world, and we
stationed 44 technical assistance missions in 32 nations by 1995,
an increase of 10 over 1985. (4) we sought to expand trade and
investment ties in the Asia-Pacific area, being the largest investor
in Vietnam and Malaysia...He has earned greater respects from
people at home and abroad...While we are eager to reduce the
hostilities between the two sides of the Taiwan strait, we shall not
retreat from the international community.'* 64
As part of this effort, Lee made unofficial trips throughout Southeast Asia,
Central America, Europe and South Africa in 1994. In April 1995, he visited the
United Arab Emirates and Jordan in a "Middle Eastern tour." Two months later,
however, his most controversial outing was made to the United States. While
labeled "unofficial" or "private," Hsu Shui-teh admitted that "all these trips were
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significant in strengthening international relations and cooperation." In the same
text, however, Hsu argued that:
We have to emphasize that our pragmatic diplomacy has nothing to
do with separatism as alleged by Beijing. We have never
advocated a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" policy as
suspected by Beijing...the ROC's mainland China policy is to seek
eventual reunification with China under the condition that freedom,
democracy and social equality prevail in entire China. 165
PRC leadership obviously perceived the Taiwanese president's actions
and policies quite differently, prompting the more aggressive response in the
spring of 1996. In referring to the missile crisis of March, an editorial in Renmin
Ribao in July 1996 stated:
As is known to all, the direct cause of this tempest was Lee Teng-
hui's visit to the United States in 1995. Yet a deeper cause is that
since the beginning of the 1990's, the Taiwan authorities have
made a series of substantive changes to both their internal and
their external policies; and it is increasingly obvious that these
changes have departed from the principle of "one China," and are
openly moving in the direction of "two Chinas" or "one China, one
Taiwan."166
International travel by senior Taiwanese leadership represented only one
aspect of Lee's pursuit of more pragmatic diplomacy, or what Beijing referred to
as "de facto independence."167 The PRC military actions in 1995-96 must also
be considered against a backdrop of other Taiwanese international initiatives
and internal events in the early and mid 1990s. Regular efforts to gain
representation in the U.N., arms purchases from the U.S. and France, and the
transition to representative democracy, to include popular elections, are but a
few examples. The last issue is significant in many respects, but in this context,
participation by candidates who explicitly advocated independence for Taiwan,
164
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such as some representing the Democratic Progressive Party, were perceived by
Beijing as pushing the envelope a bit too far, prompting such stern warnings as:
The Taiwan authorities should be aware of this fact: The stability
and prosperity of Taiwan is inseparable from its attitude toward its
reunification with the motherland. The Chinese Government has
the determination and the ability to safeguard national unification
and territorial integrity, and will not sit and watch Taiwan splitting
itself from the motherland. 168
Just prior to the initiation of the March 1996 PLA exercises, PRC
President Jiang Zemin stated that the missile exercises were "normal military
exercises" aimed at "improving China's military capability for safeguarding
national security and unity." Moreover, and in light of doubts about the China's
capability to employ military force to pursue its reunification policy, a likely PLA
objective was to exercise and display its capability to coordinate a complex,
large-scale operation to control the Straits. Ultimately, however, Jiang
simultaneous warning against Taiwan independence, in which he stated that "our
struggle will not stop for a single day so long as Taiwan authorities do not cease
their activities to split the motherland," reveal the real purpose of the exercise.
He further reiterated that even while the PRC embraced a policy of peaceful
reunification, it would "on no account allow any forces to change, in any way,
Taiwan's status as part of China."169
3. Conclusion
The transition in mainland calls from "liberate Taiwan" to the policy of
"peaceful reunification" and "one country, two systems" reflect a legitimate
application of the Chinese penchant to "action for change" and flexibility in light
of evolving domestic priorities and external environment. Concurrently, the
nature of Beijing's response to Taiwanese actions through the early 1990s,
culminating in the 1996 missile crisis, reflected the enduring influence of the
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Jiang, like the core leaders before him, appears committed to taking whatever
steps are necessary, including the use of military force, to prevent the integrity of
China's sovereignty and territory from being violated. Consequently, Taiwan
presents Beijing with perhaps its most vexing security dilemma in an otherwise
relatively tranquil regional environment.
Chinese leaders realize that the application of military force in an attempt
to resolve the stand-off would severely undermine the long-term developmental
goals embraced by official ideology. On the other hand, the fragile nature of the
CCP's political legitimacy could ill afford a loss in "face" in the Taiwan issue.
Consequently, contemporary official ideology, among other factors, likely serves
as a constraint to what might otherwise be a more aggressive reunification
policy.
F. SUMMARY
This case study, while recognizing that multiple variables influence a
state's external security responses, affirms that official ideology has been a key
variable in PRC foreign and security policy. As would be expected given the
transition in substance, emphasis and role of ideology, the character of the
influence has evolved as well. During the Revolutionary era, official ideology
provided a clearly defined world view and framework for action. Ideology dictated
aggressive action in a world dominated by class struggle, imperialist forces, and
inevitable warfare.
The recognition of a more complex international order and adoption of
fundamentally different domestic strategies encouraged greater flexibility in
foreign policy in the Reform era. Still, official ideology provided a set of more
general tenets which defined acceptable state behavior in the international arena
which served to guide, or limit, policy decision-making. The embrace of
nationalistic themes by the Party may further limit Beijing's disposition for
compromise on some issue. Anticipating the direction of China's on-going pursuit
of equilibrium in principle and practice represents a valuable indicator of the
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probable direction of PRC international behavior. Accordingly, it is to this topic
and its implications for the future of PRC foreign and security policy that this
thesis turns.
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IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Ifyou can correct yourself, what problem will you have in governing? Ifyou cant
correct yourself, how can you correct others?
Confucian Analects
A. INTRODUCTION
This study has traced China's ideological transformation from
revolutionary to post-revolutionary state, and the resulting impact on its foreign
and security policy. It has argued that changes in the perceptions and priorities
of senior leaders make a difference in policy-making. In other words, "ideas
serve as roadmaps" in foreign policy issues. 170 This roadmap has been
continuously updated in the natural theoretical processes embraced by Chinese
communism.
This chapter will look to the future, exploring the possible trajectories for
further ideological change. Specifically, what forces will contribute to continued
dynamism in the ideological realm, and how is PRC official ideology likely to
develop? What is the likely impact upon Chinese foreign and security policy?
And what are relevant U.S. policy considerations? It is always risky to predict
the character of a country's foreign policy, but at present Jiang Zemin appears to
have solidified his position as a core leader of the Third Generation and has
explicitly committed the PRC towards the general trends developed in the
Reform era towards modernization and increased openness and international
cooperation. Still, China faces a myriad of domestic challenges which will
undoubtedly influence its external behavior, to include corruption, demands for
greater regional autonomy, environmental degradation, and growing energy
requirements, to name only a few. Beijing's response to these "dangers and
opportunities" will result from the interaction of many variables, but ideological
perspectives will continue to play a role.
,70Zhao, 230.
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B. THE DIALECTIC IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A NEW IDEOLOGY
FOR THE 21 st CENTURY?
Chapter II concluded by considering the evolution of official ideology in
light of the unique Chinese cognitive process and the relationship of theory to
practice, the influence of the dialectical reasoning model adopted from Marxist
philosophy, and the diverging realms of pure and practical ideology. The
evolution of official ideology in the PRC was the product of all these processes
and was, in fact, considered a normal feature - absent of contradiction - of
Chinese Communist thought. Domestically, the Party reinterpreted development
of the "forces of production" and consequent modernization and stability as the
primary contradiction over class struggle. Perceptions of the international
environment rejected the inevitability of conflict envisioned by Mao for a much
greater chance for "peaceful co-existence." Party ideology stresses that China is
no longer a revolutionary power seeking to undermine the status quo, and public
statements explicitly reject a role as global ideological adversary to the United
States and expansionist goals.
Accordingly, China's primary foreign policy goal for the 21 st century has
been identified as the cementing of political friendships and a stable international
environment that will allow Beijing to develop its economy and its trade and to
acquire advanced technology. 171 This has been emphasized in our exploration of
PRC ideological trends during the Reform era and is echoed by the 1992
comments of Qian Qichen.
China is experiencing a period of vigorous development, with
economic construction as the focus. Its foreign policy must help
create a long-standing and steady international environment of
peace for its economic construction...At present, all nations,
developed or developing, share the view that a country's national
strength, especially in the economic sense, will decide its status in
the 21 st Century. Therefore, they are generally turning their
attention to domestic affairs, attaching great importance to
171 Wayne Bert, "Chinese Politics and U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey 23, no. 3
(March 1993), cited in Faust and Kornberg, 21.
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economic construction and cooperation. All nations are becoming
more interdependent, harmonious, complementary, and mutually
restricted.
172
This statement appears to express the essence of Beijing's perception of
the international environment and China's security approach in the post-Cold
War world. Third generation leadership has explicitly reject any deviation from
the course set by Deng. Still, CCP ideology continues to display great dynamism
in the post-Cold War. In the economic policy arena, for example, cooperative
shareholding, seemingly nudging the PRC closer to capitalism, has been
embraced for some sectors of the Chinese economy as "enterprise ownership
with Chinese characteristics."173 The machinations of the Chinese dialectical
reasoning process ensures there is no contradiction between the ultimate goals
of communism and official policies espoused in the pursuit of material wealth and
stability. Thus "China will continue to undergo profound changes, but at its own
pace and its own distinctive way."174
In other policy areas, and even as Deng Xiaoping Theory has endorsed
"scientific socialism" and exalted modernization, stability and peace, other more
traditional Chinese themes and forces have become centerpieces in Party
propaganda, especially since 1989. The increasing importance of these
traditional concepts are likely to require dialectical solution if conflict with national
goals set by Deng's Theory is to be avoided. An understanding of these forces
is fundamental in grasping the challenges the PRC leadership face in the
ideological realm.
1 . The Forces for Change
China's official ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought-Deng
Xiaoping Theory will continue to be refashioned and reinterpreted as current
1/2 «pRC Washington Embassy," Press Release No. 1 1 (30 December 1992), cited in Faust and
Komberg, 248.
173 See Li Ji, "Cooperative Shareholding System: Enterprise Ownership With Chinese
Characteristics," Beijing Review 40, no. 37 (15 September 1997).
174 Doak Barnett cited in Zhao, 33.
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needs require. As we have seen, this is partly driven by the thought processes
and theoretical model inherent in Chinese Communist system. Two other forces
will contribute to the continued evolution of Chinese ideology: first, the declining
distinction between formal and informal ideology as the two systems exist side
by side over an extended period; and second, the pursuit of political legitimacy
and regime survival by the CCP. These concepts are developed separately and
more fully below yet they are intricately connected.
a. A More "Authentic" Ideology?
The elements, or perspectives, that comprise China's informal
ideology, which were briefly introduced in the first chapter, tend to be more
stable than those examined advocated by official ideology. Generally
considered to include the "assumptions, prejudices, cultural values, and
expectations not explicitly formulated or linked together," informal ideology
derives from an "individual's socialization into a specific culture at a specific point
in time" and tends to be consensual rather than divisive. 175 In a post-
revolutionary system, posits John Bryan Starr, ideology relates to culture as
thesis relates to antithesis. The result of this relationship over the course of time
is an altered ideology as well as an altered culture. 176 This argues not only for
the increased prominence of traditional perspectives over time, but that the
precepts of official ideology will continue to inform the thinking of Chinese
political leaders.
Even Mao is said to have recognized the combined influence of
ideology and traditional thinking when he declared that the PRC had "two
parents" - the October Revolution and KMT society. 177 By "October Revolution"
Mao was referring to the influence of Marxism-Leninism adopted by China from
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influence of the ideas, attitudes, and institutions that developed during the period
of KMT reign, but throughout China's long history. 178
Other sources reinforce the inevitability of this process. Franz
Schurmann, in the first edition of his book Ideology and Organization in
Communist China, argued that a true revolution destroys the value structure and
the division of labor, or social system, in which it takes place until a new value
structure and division of labor have grown up. 179 The value structure, which
represents the conceptual compilation of the values shared by most members of
a society, is at least temporarily replaced by ideology and organization, with
ideology as the product, at the outset at least, of a creative act on the part of the
revolutionary ideologue.
In the supplement to the revised edition of his book, however,
Schurmann notes that he might have better titled the book "Ideology,
Organization, and Society in China" because of the important role that he now
sees the society as continuing to play after the revolutionary act that he once
saw as destroying that society. 180 In referring to the "resurgence of the forces of
Chinese society," he appears to be arguing that a society does not die as the
result of a revolution, but that the pre-revolutionary society and the revolutionary
ideology continue to exist side by side over a protracted period. The element of
the society that is equivalent to the ideology in this prolonged relationship, it
would appear, is not the value structure but the culture as a whole. It is the pre-
revolutionary culture that continues to exist after the revolutionary act and the
ideology that acts as a kind of counterculture. The relationship between the two
is a dialectical one and the synthesis that results from this relationship coincides
with neither but contains elements of both. 181
With regard to China's external relations, the influence of informal






• The Chinese People are a great people, and China is a great nation
• The Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that which it has
experienced in the modern world
• China should be accorded compensatory treatment from those powers
which have insulted or injured it in the past
• As a great nation, China naturally occupies a central position in world
affairs and must be treated as a Great Power
• China's national sovereignty must be respected absolutely, and such
respect precludes any foreign criticism of China's internal politics
• China's special virtue in international affairs consists in the fact that its
foreign policy is based not on expediency but on immutable principles
that express universal values such as justice and equity182
It is interesting to note that these concepts address China's status
as a nation and call to mind most of the common themes reviewed earlier.
Drawing from the historical experiences of the past one and a half centuries,
informal ideology is shaped by Chinese nationalism which, in addition to those
above, sound the recurring themes of independence, self-reliance, and non-
alignment.
b. Pursuit of the "Mandate of Heaven "
Certainly a driving force in the ideological dynamism of the Reform
era is the Party's ongoing pursuit of regime legitimacy and survival, reinforced by
an overwhelming desire for social and political stability.'183 Issues surrounding
this concept of Chinese political thought, which lean heavily upon traditional






sinologists. 184 There is almost universal agreement that the damage inflicted on
China and on communist ideology by Mao's ideological crusades, both domestic
and international, were enormous, at least, among intellectuals and majority of
the population. In the international arena, the conflict between China and the
Soviet Union, for example, with each claiming a monopoly on the communist
ideological truth, gravely weakened the universalist claims of Marxism-Leninism.
Domestically, the results of Mao's radical efforts to remake society, most explicit
in the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, significantly contributed to an
erosion of the ideological foundations for leadership by the Party. As a result,
the self-initiated assault on official ideology has threatened to undermine the
central role of the Communist Party, producing not only a crisis of faith but a
crisis of power. 185
As a consequence, the Party has increasingly incorporated more
acceptable nationalist themes in ideological work to bolster claims of legitimacy.
This trend has significant implications for Chinese security policy. While Deng
Xiaoping Theory encourages international behavior that contributes to China's
role as a mature, stable, and responsible international player, issues that are
motivated by nationalistic fervor might direct Beijing toward a more aggressive or




The competing forces outlined above will continue to mold Beijing's view
of the world and influence Chinese foreign and security policy. Given the
enduring nature of the Chinese Communist system of thought, these ideological
issues, or contradictions, are certain to be confronted within the framework of
dialectical reasoning. The most important of these dialectics are outlined below
184 See Lucian W. Pye, "Chinese Democracy and Constitutional Development," and Lu Xueyi,
"Prospects for Social Development," in China in the Twenty-first Century: Politics, Economy, and
Society, ed. Fumio Itoh (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997).
185
Levine, 31.
186 Deng Vol III, 147.
87
in Figure 4. Particularly interesting in this process is the gradual reversal of
opposing forces in this process. Starr's early proposition expressing the
relationship of ideology to culture no longer appears completely valid. In light of
the resurgence of more traditional themes during a relatively lengthy period of
Communist rule, "culture" seems to have increasingly assumed the role as thesis
with official ideology the antithesis.
The eventual synthesis of these processes is difficult to project, but is
certain to maintain characteristics of both formal and informal ideology and
remain fundamentally different from Western approaches to social and
international discourse. Whatever the synthesis, the redefinition of the Chinese
world view and security requirements will do much to determine regional and
global stability and define China's place in the post-Cold War era. To establish a
timeframe for the following discussion, the short-term is considered the next five
to ten years while the intermediate term through the middle of the next century.
These dialectics contrast ideological struggles in three areas: first, over
the primary guiding principle in international relations; second, over perceptions
of China's status and role in the post-Cold War era; and finally, the domestic
factor.
pragmatism 4 > dogmatism
great power < developing nation
Leninism 4 pluralism
Figure 4. Critical Dialectics
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a. Pragmatism vs. Dogmatism
This study has traced not only the evolution of Maoist dogma, but
its declining influence since the beginning of the Reform era. This does not,
however, suggest that all Marxist-Leninist-Maoist dogmatic precepts are
irrelevant, but that most have been remolded, reprioritized, and reinterpreted as
well as become less prescriptive in policy formation. Some have even been
rejected. Still, the process is not resolved, and continues to represent China's
primary contradiction, as is perhaps best exemplified by continued adherence to
the Four Cardinal Principles. This evolution will continue over the intermediate to
long term and is almost certain to be governed by the Party and within the
unique Chinese Communist system of thought, and its resolution or ultimate
synthesis will transcend almost every facet of PRC external relations and
behavior.
Over at least the short term, however, and even though the
ideological struggle between the two basic approaches has tilted significantly
toward pragmatism, increasingly the dialectic equation has had to accommodate
the forces of nationalism. Whereas dogma once clearly dictated proper
international associations and behavior in external relations, nationalism has
become a primary limiting factor in PRC foreign and security policy decisions, at
least with regard to several concrete foreign policy issues. Specifically,
nationalistic concerns could undermine China's long-term economic goals and
relatively stable external relations by tipping the scales in favor of military force to
resolve highly sensitive territorial issues, such as over the relationship with
Taiwan, the disputes over South China Sea Islands, or with Japan over Diaoyu
Islands. More broadly, the fragility of Party legitimacy and self-perception seems
to push Beijing toward reliance on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity as
it struggles to replace discredited dogma.
This duality in Chinese strategic goals, or pragmatic efforts to
achieve national prosperity through investment and interaction with the rest of
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b. Great Power vs. Developing Nation
Among other ideological developments, Chapter II traced the
evolution and influence of the Chinese national identity on foreign and security
policy. This development has continued as the PRC, like many other
international actors since the end of the Cold War, has struggled to redefine its
role and status in the international system. This challenge has been especially
difficult for China. The after effects of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, the
collapse of the USSR and international communism, its own international
behavior, and the changing economic and security environment of the post-Cold
War world have prevented the PRC from attaining the full measure of
acceptance and participation in global affairs commensurate with its self-
perceived status. Accordingly, this dialectic manifests itself as the struggle
between China's perception of its rightful role and position in the new world
order, heavily influenced by the unwritten precepts of informal ideology, and the
reality of its developing status and international behavior as influenced by the
pragmatic pursuit of modernization and political influence. More broadly, it also
incorporates the contradiction between China's traditional desire for self-reliance
versus the international trend toward interdependence, balancing military
modernization versus international cooperation, and even influences the pursuit
of bilateral versus multilateral relations.
While it is difficult to quantify a state's power and international rank,
Samuel Kim posits that a great power is:
...a state that easily ranks among the top five in the primary global
structures - economic, military, knowledge, and normative...and
that enjoys relative economic self-sufficiency. A great power is a
strong state with the ability to mobilize the country's human and
material resources in the service of its worldview and policy
objectives. There is also the normative/behavioral requirement of
great power status: a great power is and becomes what a great
power does. 189
189 Samuel S. Kim, "China as a Great Power," Current History (September 1997): 246.
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While questionable whether China meets any aspect of this
definition, its position as one of the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council plus the duration of its society and culture, its
geographic expanse, population, the size and recent performance of its
economy, and sheer potential pull PRC into the circle of great, or at least
potentially great, nations. Yet it has often refused to accept or minimized this
role even while rhetoric embraces it. For example, when describing the PRC
intended role in international affairs during an address to the 15th Party Congress
in 1997, Jiang Zemin stated that:
We should take an active part in multilateral diplomatic activities
and give full play to China's role in the United Nations and other
international organizations. 190
If China currently lacks the material power necessary for great
power status, consider issues which normally fall under the category of
normative characteristics or requirements:
• In 1978, the PRC reversed its financial relationship with the United
Nations as part of ideological transition away from total self-reliance by
requesting aid from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
the largest multilateral technical aid organization. A year later, China
requested a reduction in its assessment rate, or portion of the U.N.
budget, which was subsequently reduced from 5.5 percent to 0.79
percent, then further to its present rate of 0.72 percent. Consequently,
the United Kingdom, with the second-lowest assessment rate among
the five permanent members, contributes nearly seven times as much
as China. Chinese contributions are also surpassed by a number of
other developing nations such as Brazil, South Korea, Saudi Arabia,
and Mexico. 191
• China has hesitated in actively supporting the United Nations global
security role commensurate with a permanent member of the Security
Council, as its frequent abstentions from voting decisions attest, such
as on S.C. Resolution 678 authorizing use of force to against Iraq
during the Persian Gulf crisis. Moreover, it has rejected any
190




multilateral approach to security in Asia. Yet it has availed itself of any
available economic assistance through global and regional economic
regimes. In addition to its re-designation by the UNDP from aid donor
to aid recipient, China is currently the largest recipient of World Bank
multilateral aid, about $3 billion per year, even though the World Bank
ranks it as the world's second-largest economy. It also receives
assistance from the International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development, a division of the World Bank, the International
Development Association, and International Monetary Fund, and
strongly desires accession to the World Trade Organization. At the
regional level, the PRC participates in the Asian Development Bank. 192
• One author highlights Chinese "duplicity" in international affairs
throughout the Reform era. Offending activities have included:
contributing to nuclear and other weapons proliferation through sales
to Algeria, Pakistan, and several Middle East states and unwillingness
to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until put under heavy
international pressure; a trade policy which has impeded imports,
overly restrictive business regulations of foreign companies, and
promoted the mislabeling of textile goods to circumvent other
countries' import regulations and purloining of intellectual property and
industrial secrets; and widespread human rights violations from
arbitrary arrests and incarcerations to repression in Tibet and
Xinjiang. 193
These contradictions between the Chinese self-image and potential
and the substance of its outward behavior goes beyond issues of principle and
practice to questions of regional and global security and stability. While the
"Middle Kingdom" declares itself a "developing socialist country" in need of
significant external assistance and forswears hegemonic behavior and
expansionist desires, it continues to stress bilateral relations and military
modernization that "seems poised to mobilize significant quantities of resources
for the exercise of power outside its borders."194 Further, its membership in the
exclusive "nuclear club," its large and improving military, and the centrality of
military component even within the concept of "comprehensive national strength"
192 Faust and Komberg, 220-24.
193 Robinson, "Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s," in Chinese Foreign Policy:
Theory and Practice, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 598-99.
194 Kim, 247.
94
(zonghe guoli) have heightened regional tensions and raised serious questions
over PRC ultimate motives. Accelerated attempts at expanding military activities
or increasing spheres of influence in neighboring regions is likely to trigger a
regional arms race and destabilize China relations with its neighbors and the
international community.
Over the short term, the synthesis of this dialectic will likely be the
continuation of Deng's Policy of "avoiding leadership," focusing on domestic
economic growth, and maximizing advantage while minimizing risk. Over the
long term, however, if China is to realize its potential, it will have to reconcile the
responsibilities of rising great power status and requirement for international
credibility with its "assertive unilateral realpolitik."195 The ultimate resolution will
determine whether China remains an "incomplete" or true great power as well as
be a significant factor in global and regional stability. While many variables enter
the equation, it would seem that on balance, ideological evolution will favor the
gradual embrace of philosophies conducive to behavior associated with a
responsible participant in global affairs.
c. Leninism vs. Pluralism
A consideration of China's prospects would be incomplete without
an affirmation of the importance of the domestic factor in the PRC's international
behavior. Issues of regime legitimacy and survival, which have both an internal
and external component, have been inextricably linked to the preceding
dialectics and will continue to influence China's security perceptions and
relations with the world. There appears to be widespread recognition that the
Party can survive only if it restores its credibility among the people. As this study
has shown, however, efforts to achieve this goal have focused upon improving
the material well being of the nation and cultivating greater pride in the national




reform, not political structures, is the key to human progress, 196 and that the
Communist Party must remain firmly in control of political and social discourse.
Another obvious method for the Party to retain political control is through the
maintenance of a strong and well-disciplined (i.e., politically indoctrinated) armed
forces. Drawing again from Jiang's address to the 15th Party Congress in 1997:
Only the Communist Party of China can lead the Chinese people in
achieving victories of national independence, the people's
liberation and socialism, pioneering the road of building socialism
with Chinese characteristics, rejuvenating the nation, making the
country prosperous and strong and improving the people's well-
being. 197
Still the tide of change does not favor this approach. Thomas
Robinson observes that the events of 1989-1991 in East Europe and USSR
displayed that "revolution is no longer equated with Marxism-Leninism,
totalitarianism, and central planning, but with anti-communism and
marketization."198 Further, most western scholars and politicians concur that
economic growth inevitably means "marketization" and that the consequent
economic modernization will eventuate in democratization, most commonly
based upon ideas of representative government and individual freedom. Beijing,
however, observing events just to its north, and its own experience in Tianamen
in 1989, realized that the transition to this form of domestic order could be highly
unstable, a characteristic that is almost universally despised in China. Further
influenced by cultural traditions which encouraged the belief that democracy
must be tempered by respect for authority and willingness to subjugate individual
rights to the common interests, the Party leadership has determined to remain in
firm control of the dialectic reasoning process. Still, the PRC will probably
continue to evolve incrementally toward some form of "soft" authoritarian system
196 Faust and Kornberg, 254.
197
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198 Robinson, 590.
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over the intermediate time frame, with the long-term synthesis likely to produce a
pluralistic system.
These forces obviously carry direct implications for Chinese foreign
policy in the new era. As Robinson posits, the challenge for Beijing has been
and will remain to formulate a "centrist foreign policy founded on the principles of
avoiding conflict with the market democracies" and "playing for time until China is
strong enough to have a say in determining the shape of the follow-on
international system." Moreover, if the "market democracy has become a near
universal norm, then Beijing must learn how to get along with such countries
permanently."199
3. Summary
Forces for the evolution of official ideology in China remain strong and will
continue to seek equilibrium within the conceptual framework of Chinese
Communist thought. Over the short term, and as a consequence of political
commitments made by the Party and continued cultivation of nationalism as a
basis for legitimacy and external relations, it will be difficult for Beijing to exercise
flexibility on many important foreign policy issues. The CCP cannot afford to
appear to compromise on issues of sovereignty or national prerogative, such as
relations with Taiwan or the status of China's territorial claims in the South China
Sea. This imperative, however, does not necessarily apply in other, "non-core
areas" such as human rights or nuclear proliferation.200 External pressure for
change in these areas are likely to be met with nationalistic statements about
intrusions into China's internal affairs, but the obvious benefits to China's long-
term development plans will encourage the PRC leadership to find some ground
for compromise in these areas to achieve a sense of moderation and "centrism."
The Chinese are often credited with taking a much longer-term view of the
world than most countries. Over the long-term, the forces for change are likely to
move the PRC in the direction of greater pluralism and economic
199 Robinson, 592.
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interdependence as long as the transition complies with certain central principles
such as that of promoting social and political stability and maximizing equality.
Still, the synthesis of major dialectics will in all likelihood result in systems and
philosophies that are different from Western concepts. Accordingly, Chinese
international conduct will be less predictable in many areas. It is likely to
become more cooperative and assertive on a wide range of issues as it gains
credibility and legitimacy and, like other international actors, seeks to shape to its
own advantage the terms and conditions of its engagement with the world.
C. U.S.-SINO RELATIONS
1. Security Interests and Policies
Successive American administrations since Nixon's have determined that
friendly relations with the PRC are in the national interests of the United
States. 201 In fact, it seems almost tautological to suggest that a moderately
strong and growing, stable China pursuing a policy of broad contact and friendly
relations with the West is in the United States national interests. As Richard
Nixon pointed out in 1989, "with Japan already an economic superpower and
with the capability of becoming a military and political superpower, a strong,
stable China... is essential to the balance of power of Japan" in East Asia.202
Thus, from the U.S. perspective, China's strategic importance in the Asia-Pacific
region, and therefore its foreign policy, will remain a vital concern.
That stated, this study has examined only one of the multitude of variables
which has influenced the PRC relationship with the United States and world.
And while there continues to be much debate surrounding the proper direction of
U.S. policy toward China, Davis Shambaugh provides a succinct and accurate
appraisal of U.S.-Sino relations. He argues that the United States and the PRC
200 7997 Strategic Review.
201 See David Shambaugh, "Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," in Chinese
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 219-20.
202 Cited in Zhao, 243.
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will "cooperate in some spheres and clash in others,"203 a relationship not
fundamentally different than many others. He goes on to add that "a relationship
has emerged where each know it must cooperate where possible but has real
difficulties in doing so."
For Beijing, to conduct relations with the United States is to confront a
paradox. Development imperatives dictate broad and close interaction, while
perceived longer-term strategic imperatives produce suspicion and competition.
However, Beijing's pronouncements and present policies clearly indicate that its
official ideology has evolved toward a pragmatism necessary to achieve greater
economic development while operating within the constraints of nationalistic
commitments in several areas. And despite frictions over a number of concrete
issues such as trade imbalances, intellectual property, weapons proliferation,
and human rights, Beijing shows no evidence of any willingness to allow its ties
with Washington to collapse or evolve towards military conflict.204 With the major
exception of U.S. support for Taiwan independence, the PRC is unlikely to find a
reason to do so over the short to intermediate term.
Still, a more fundamental impediment to establishing a more cooperative
relationship over the long term,205 and more directly related to the central theme
of this study, lies not in the specific issues of the moment, but in deeper historical
and social forces. China's entire modern history has been shaped by the
requirement to first throw off, then continue to resist, foreign control and
interference. As we have seen, the PRC has continued that effort by declaring a
security policy which seeks to counter what it describes as "hegemony" and
"superpower mentality."
The U.S., on the other hand, prides itself a global power pursuing a
foreign policy which seeks to impart the universal principles it holds dear upon
203 David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: Cooperation or Confrontation," Current
History (September 1997): 241.
204 1997 Strategic Review.
205 Shambaugh, "The United States and China: Cooperation or Confrontation," Current History.
241-42.
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others. Specifically, the 1997 National Security Strategy for a New Century
states:
We must use the America's leadership to harness global forces of
integration, reshaping existing security, economic and political
structures, and build new ones that help create the conditions
necessary for our interest and values to survive...we must be
prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national
power to influence the actions of other states and non-state
actors.
206
As part of that overall strategy, U.S. policy remains imbued with a long-
standing "missionary complex" designed to modernize, democratize, educate,
and covert China into the Western image. This impulse has never been more
apparent than today in U.S.-Sino relations, yet the stronger China becomes, the
more resistant it is to American pressure and paternalism. 207 This attitude is
most directly expressed in a recent commentary in the Beijing Review.
From China's point of view, it is necessary and possible for the U.S.
to realize...that other countries have the right to choose their own
paths of development. 208
2. Policy Considerations
Against this backdrop and within the framework of an acceptable U.S.
policy of engagement with China, there is a need for greater awareness and
appreciation of the forces for change within the PRC as well as the principles
which preclude compromise. Generally, U.S. policy-makers must recognize that
official ideology is not so irrelevant as widely supposed. In fact, an appreciation
of the Chinese Communist conceptual process can assist the analyst in
projecting the likely direction, or synthesis, of policy processes if the proper
dialectic can be identified. And while dogma has evolved and become less
206 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997): i-2.
207 Shambaugh, "The United States and China: Cooperation or Confrontation," Current History.
242.
208
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distinct and confrontational, it may serve as a guide for the prevailing the
consensus among senior Party leadership.
Over the short to intermediate term, Chinese nationalism will remain a
significant variable in foreign and security policy issues, especially those
involving territorial and other issues of sovereignty. In other areas, such as
weapons and nuclear proliferation, intellectual property rights, and trade issues,
Beijing will be more likely to find compromises as the pragmatic approach
remains dominant as the primary theme in external relations.
Over the long term, an effective U.S. approach must include realistic
expectations for Chinese behavior and organization, as well as appropriate
benchmarks forjudging Beijing's policies, based on a better understanding of the
dialectic thought processes guiding China's political, economic, and social
transformation. These processes will likely produce some amalgam of
authoritarian political system which values a centralized market economy and
emphasizes the collective welfare and stability over individual liberty. While
perhaps lacking by U.S. standards, excessive pressures to adopt more western




In one form or another, perception and ideology has played and will
continue to play a role in the foreign policy of every state, and China is no
exception. What distinguishes the PRC, however, particularly in the early years,
was the application of a highly articulated, systematic, formal ideology derived
from Marxism-Leninism to the realm of foreign and security policy on the
assumption that it could provide China's leaders with an accurate guide to the
choices they faced in the international arena. However, the behavior of other
states, including China's formal ally, the USSR, often diverged from what
predicates of official ideology suggested. Consequently, but within the
framework of the cognitive processes they also inherited from Marxism, Party
leadership attempted to resolve perceived contradictions, frequently resulting in
an international zig-zap pattern between East and West. Still, official ideology
clearly informed the general direction of policy in international relations. It
portrayed the system as inherently hostile and clearly identified who was friend
or foe.
Under Deng, the substance and the role of official ideology changed.
While many of the specific tenets either fell to the wayside or were modified,
many of the concepts, language, and thought processes of the Chinese form of
communism continued to inform the thinking of Chinese political leaders, thus,
they continued to justify and express their foreign policy choices in ideological
terms. The Third generation of Communist leadership has continued this trend.
Increasingly, however, ideology has assumed more the role of a "value
framework" for development and interaction. It reflects more long-term
developmental goals and fundamental social values within which an advanced
economy and modern society can be constructed over a period of many
decades. Adherence to this official ideology, and obviously the Four Cardinal
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Principles, is portrayed as the guarantee of the social and political stability
needed for such development.
Other significant forces are influencing the evolution of ideology in China,
and consequently its relations with the rest of the world. A "rising China" and
proud population, seeking to bury the humiliations of the past, have encouraged
a resurgent nationalism. The course these sentiments are encouraged to take,
whether affirmative and patriotic or aggressive, will influence the degree of
flexibility Beijing is likely to display over issues of sovereignty and territory. Other
nations, and specifically the U.S., must determine the degree to which this factor
motivates the PRC in specific issues to minimize the chance for unnecessary
confrontation.
Finally, even while the content and focus of official ideology has evolved,
and Party theoreticians have struggled to integrate the disparate strands of
theory and practice, it is worth reminding that formal ideology is not likely to
disappear without leaving some imprint on China's political processes, and
ultimately its future foreign relations. Rather, an evolving Chinese ideology is
likely to incorporate elements of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist world view into a
new amalgam that will also contain elements from China's imperial past, a more
modern conception of nationalism, and perhaps eventually the Republican era
teachings of Sun Yat-sen. Whatever the case, it is almost certain to be distinctly
Chinese and significantly influence the course of regional and world events.
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